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ABSTRACT 
Institutional Stock Ownership and Corporate Dividend Policy: 
Evidence from China 
by 
SHEN Jianghua 
Master of Philosophy 
Agency theory suggests that institutional stockholders are able to influence the 
dividend policies of listed firms with the underlying objective of reducing a firm’s 
agency costs. This study explores the causal effects of institutional ownership on 
dividend policies for the firms listed in China. Using various measures of 
institutional ownership and dividend policy, I find that mutual fund ownership in a 
firm causes it to pay out more cash dividends or to initiate cash dividends. These 
effects are mainly evident in the firms controlled by the state and regional 
governments and those with relatively high free cash flows. The effects are also 
shown to be stronger when the mutual fund investment horizon is longer. However, 
firms with existing high levels of cash dividends do not attract mutual fund investors. 
The results still hold when I use different methods to mitigate the endogeneity 
problem. Mutual fund ownership is also shown to reduce agency costs and improve 
the operating performances of the firms that they invest in. Other institutional 
investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and securities companies appear to 
have different influences from those of mutual funds on firms’ cash dividend 
payments, agency costs and operating performances. My results support the agency 
costs explanation of institutional ownership and dividend policy.  
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Institutional Stock Ownership and Corporate Dividend Policy:  
Evidence from China 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The governance effects of institutional investors have been widely studied. Most 
literature focuses on whether institutional ownership can affect firm value and specific 
aspects of corporate governance (e.g., Chen et al., 2007; Yuan et al., 2008; Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008; Ferreira et al., 2010; Aggarwal et al., 2011), while the monitoring roles 
of institutional investors on corporate financial policies and decisions are relatively 
under-investigated, especially in emerging markets. 
In this study, I examine the role of institutional investors in influencing one of 
firm’s major policy decisions, namely cash dividend payouts, in China. Higher cash 
dividends can reduce a firm’s agency costs and impose more discipline on the directors. 
For example, dividends reduce a firm’s free cash flow that might otherwise be 
squandered on management perquisites or otherwise wasted (Jensen, 1986). 
Furthermore, higher dividends reduce managers’ abilities to finance new investments 
from internal resources. Instead, managers have to turn to external sources of funds to 
finance their expansion plans and this exposes them to market scrutiny (Rozeff, 1982; 
Easterbrook, 1984). Although market scrutiny is costly, it may help prevent 
overinvestment in projects with negative net present values. Left to their own devices, 
managers might not want to pay out high dividends as this reduces their discretionary 
spending. Active institutional shareholders thus may play an important role by 
insisting on dividend payments for the firms they invest in (Eckbo and Verma, 1994). 
2 
Small investors, on the other hand, are unlikely to be able to exert much influence on a 
firm’s top management. Therefore, a positive relation between institutional investors 
and dividend payouts are expected. I derive implications of the agency cost theory and 
extend the extant literature by examining how institutional investors influence 
dividend policies of firms listed in China. 
The prior literature on the empirical relations between institutional ownership and 
firms’ dividend payments have generated mixed results. Short et al. (2002) find that in 
the U.K., institutional ownership can enhance the contemporary and positive relation 
between earnings and dividends while managerial ownership weakens the relation. 
Using U.S. data, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) show that although institutions avoid 
investing in firms that do not pay any dividends, they neither prefer investing in firms 
with higher dividends nor appear to influence firms in which they have invested to 
increase dividends. Motivated by tax consideration arguments, Hotchkiss and 
Lawrence (2007) and Desai and Jin (2011) find that institutional investors that serve 
taxable clients are less likely to increase their stock holdings in firms with high 
dividend payments, and that firms with these tax-averse institutional investors tend to 
reduce dividend payments. These research studies mostly examine the investment 
preferences of mutual funds and other institutional investors (i.e., whether higher 
dividends can attract institutional investments), but draw few or insignificant 
conclusions about whether institutional investors can influence dividend policies, as 
predicted by agency theory.  
My study extends the prior literature by investigating whether Chinese 
institutional investors have an influence on the dividend payouts of firms in which they 
invest. Different from the results found for U.S. firms by Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005), I find a positive effect, which is consistent with the agency theory and the 
3 
monitoring roles of institutional investors. China is an interesting setting for my 
research because of the government’s influence over the listed firms, a feature which is 
far more pervasive than in the major developed markets of the U.S. and Europe. 
Moreover, the individual investors have limited abilities to monitor firms due to the 
weak shareholder protection in the country and higher information asymmetry. Thus, 
institutional investors in China have a potentially important role to play in monitoring 
firms and have different incentives than their counterparts in the developed market 
economies. 
The major institutional investors in China are banks, securities companies, 
insurance companies, pension funds, and open-end mutual funds. Of these, mutual 
funds stand apart because of the intense competition among funds in the industry and 
the short term investment horizons of the retail investors they serve. Mutual funds 
have to fight hard to gain new unit holders and retain existing customers, and they 
achieve this primarily through the performance of their funds. In order to improve their 
own financial performance, mutual funds seek out what they believe are under-valued 
firms and put pressure on them to maximize profits (Yuan et al., 2008) and reduce 
agency costs. In contrast, banks, securities companies, insurance companies, and 
pension funds have captive investors and short term (and even long term) financial 
performance is less critical for them. Furthermore, these institutions are often 
controlled by, or are heavily influenced by central government and they are as much 
concerned about promoting government economic policies as they are about 
maximizing the efficiency of the firms they invest in. Moreover, these institutions 
often have business dealings with the listed firms where they have share ownerships 
and this may impinge on their efficiency. Based on this understanding of the incentives 
facing the different institutional investors, I argue that mutual funds will be the most 
4 
proactive in influencing firms’ dividend policies. 
This study examines the relation between institutional stock holdings and cash 
dividends in China during the period 2003-2011. I distinguish between the relatively 
more independent institutional investors, domestic mutual funds, and other institutions 
that might have business relations with the listed firms, including banks, insurance 
companies, and securities companies (hereafter BIS). I capture the dividend policies of 
listed firms using both the decision to pay dividends and the dividend amount. My 
regression results show that mutual fund ownership leads firms to pay cash dividends 
or to increase cash dividends if the firms already pay dividends, while the BIS do not. I 
find that the positive effects of mutual funds on dividend payments are mainly driven 
by state owned enterprises (SOEs
1
) and firms with relatively high free cash flows. 
SOEs tend to have higher agency costs due to the obsolete state assets management 
system (Mi and Wang, 2000) and it is for these firms that the mutual funds have the 
greatest incentives to influence dividend policy. The positive effects for SOEs are 
stronger when the investment horizons of mutual funds are longer. My results indicate 
that mutual funds in China play a positive role in the dividend policies of the firms that 
have potentially higher agency costs. Therefore, I provide evidence consistent with the 
monitoring hypothesis of financial institutions and the agency theory relating 
dividends, agency costs and institutional ownership.  
The regression analysis on the relations between institutional ownership and 
dividend policies are subject to potential endogeneity problems. First, the institutional 
ownership and cash dividends may both be endogenously determined by some omitted 
(unobservable) firm-specific variables. Second, institutional investors instead of 
                                                             
1
SOEs are defined as firms whose ultimate controlling shareholder is the central government, local 
government or government agency, zero otherwise. The ultimate controlling shareholders of listed firms 
are obtained from the CSMAR database. 
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forcing management to issue more cash dividends could choose to invest in firms that 
already have high dividend payments. To deal with the potential endogeneity problems 
arising from omitted variables, firm fixed-effect regressions with all independent 
variables lagged one year are used. I also use the changes in variables, i.e., regressing 
the change in cash dividend payment from time t-1 to t against the change in 
institutional ownership from time t-2 to t-1, and find positive and significant estimated 
coefficients. In order to test whether the institutional investors choose to invest in firms 
that already have higher cash dividends, I transpose the main independent and 
dependent variables and regress the changes in institutional ownership from time t-1 to 
t against the changes in dividend payments from time t-2 to t-1. My results indicate 
that the causation runs from institutional ownership to dividends, not the other way 
around. I also use two-stage instrumental variable regressions to further deal with the 
endogeneity problem and find consistent results. 
Agency theory states that institutions, acting as monitors of managers, should put 
pressure on firms to increase dividend payments and thereby reduce the agency costs 
caused by superfluous free cash flows. I examine this by testing directly whether 
institutions do reduce firms’ agency costs and improve firm performance. Controlling 
for a list of financial indicators and corporate governance controls, mutual funds as 
shareholders are significantly and positively related to firm performance and are 
significantly and negatively related to agency costs. The BIS institutions do not seem 
to be associated with lower agency costs or higher firm performance.  
My research contributes to the literature in the following respects. First, different 
from previous literature, the empirical evidence from my thesis suggests that mutual 
fund ownership causes a firm’s dividend policy to change. Specifically, mutual fund 
investors can increase the cash dividends of the firms that they invest in; nevertheless, 
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high cash dividends do not attract mutual fund investors. Short et al. (2002) shows a 
positive and contemporary relation between institutional investors and dividend 
payments in the U.K., but does not indicate any causality effect. Desai and Jin (2011) 
find institutional ownership and dividend policy can influence each other mutually. 
The findings of Grinstein and Michaely (2005) support neither the models predicting 
that high dividends attract institutional clientele nor the models suggesting that 
institutions cause firms to increase payments. The potential endogeneity problem is 
examined by using the firm-fixed effects models, changes of lagged variables method, 
reverse regression analysis and instrumental variable estimation. I also find that high 
cash dividends payment can attract banks, insurance companies and securities 
companies, but these institutions do not have consistently positive effects on the 
dividend policy.  
 Second, prior literature provides no support to Jensen’s (1986) agency theory for 
the monitoring effects of institutional investors, while my study finds consistent results. 
Unlike former studies that treat all firms as a whole, my study examines firms with 
relatively higher agency costs and those with relatively lower agency costs separately. 
Under the special setting of China, I find that the effects of mutual funds are more 
pronounced in firms facing higher agency costs, i.e. SOEs. My study further shows 
that institutional investors, which can lead to increases in dividend payout levels, can 
reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. 
Third, to measure the institutional ownership, previous studies about institutional 
investors and dividend policy only consider the share volume of institutions’ 
shareholdings. My research contributes to the literature by incorporating investment 
horizon of mutual funds based on the procedures outlined by Gaspar et al. (2005) and 
Attig et al. (2012).  
7 
Fourth, the thesis further contribute to the large literature (Chen et al., 2007; 
Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011) which shows that mutual funds and 
foreign institutional investors can significantly improve firm value, while institutions 
such as banks and insurance companies can not. The previous literature examines 
institutional investors’ influence on firm value but does not investigate the mechanisms 
through which institutional investors drive value enhancement. My research provides 
an explanation that institutional investors can improve firm value by increasing 
corporate cash dividends with the underlying objective to reduce the agency costs of 
free cash flows.  
Last but not least, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study relating 
institutional ownership and dividend policy in China, the second largest economy in 
the world, and my conclusions should have resonance in other transitional and 
emerging financial markets.  
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and institutional background, and develops my hypotheses. Chapter 3 
describes the data sample and descriptive statistics. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 discuss the 
regression models and my empirical results, respectively. Chapter 6 provides 
robustness tests and chapter 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2.  Literature review, institutional background and hypotheses  
 
2.1 Effects of institutional investors on firms 
The monitoring effects of institutional stock ownership on corporate governance 
have been studied extensively for many years. One strand of the literature focuses on 
the effects on firm performance. Smith (1996) shows that high level of institutional 
ownership leads to shareholder activism, which can increase shareholders’ wealth. 
Woidtke (2002) finds that firms’ Tobin’s Q is positively related to the shares held by 
private pension funds. Using a comprehensive set of data from 27 countries including 
the U.S., Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that firms with higher stock ownership held 
by foreign and independent institutions, including mutual funds, have higher firm 
valuations. Taking advantage of a unique natural experiment setting in Sweden, 
Giannetti and Laeven (2009) show that firm valuation improves if public and large 
private pension funds increase their shareholdings. Focusing on U.S. firms, Chen et al. 
(2007) find evidence showing that only concentrated shareholdings by long-term 
institutions can increase a firm’s performance, as measured by market returns and 
return on assets. 
Another strand of the recent literature investigates the influences of institutional 
investors on specific corporate governance decisions. Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that 
institutional ownership can cause an improvement in a firm’s Tobin’s Q and that 
changes in institutional ownership over time leads to subsequent positive changes in 
firm-level governance. More specifically, they find that foreign institutions’ ownership 
increases the likelihood that the board of a firm has a majority of independent directors, 
that the board size is appropriate, that the firm does not adopt a staggered board 
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provision, and that poorly performing CEOs are fired. Similarly, institutional investors 
are found to influence a firm’s executive compensation structure (Hartzell and Starks, 
2003) and a firm’s forced CEO turnover decision (Parrino et al., 2003). Through 
interviews with both senior managers of financial institutions and board directors of 
listed companies, Yuan et al. (2009) show that in China, many active mutual funds 
exercise their influences on corporate management and that some directors confirmed 
the positive effects of financial institutions’ participation in corporate governance. In 
contrast, all securities companies appeared to be passive shareholders.  
 
2.2 Institutional ownership and dividend policy 
Institutional investors, who are assumed to be better monitors, are expected to 
reduce agency costs through exerting influence on a firm’s financing decisions 
including its dividend policy. Myers (1998), Gomes (1999) and La Porta et al. (2000) 
suggest that managers and insiders may divert a firm’s profits for perquisite 
consumption, empire building and other value-destroying activities. However, 
institutional investors could reduce the free cash flows under managers’ control by 
pressing for increased dividend payments. Large payouts to shareholders may lead 
firms to raise external funds for expansion and, as a result, the firms must undergo 
monitoring by the capital market (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984). Therefore, a 
positive relation is expected between institutional ownership and dividend payments. 
Eckbo and Verma (1994) find that the magnitude of cash dividends increases with the 
voting power of institutional shareholders in Canada. 
Motivated by the monitoring hypothesis and agency theory, Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005) test the relations between institutional ownership and dividends of 
U.S. firms. However, their results support neither the models predicting that high 
10 
dividends attract institutional clientele nor those suggesting that institutions cause 
firms to pay more dividends. According to Grinstein and Michaely (2005), institutions 
avoid firms that pay no dividends, but prefer low dividends among dividend-paying 
firms. In contrast, Short et al. (2002) support a positive and contemporary association 
between dividend payout and institutional ownership for the firms in U.K.. My thesis 
will test whether institutional investors (mutual funds and BIS) in China exert 
monitoring influences on firms through affecting dividend policies, especially for the 
firms with higher potential agency costs. 
The relations between dividends and institutional stock ownerships can also be 
explained by taxes, an issue addressed by Jain (1999), and the substitution signaling 
effects of Miller and Rock (1985). Managers of listed firms may rationally react to the 
existing and potential investors’ demands by adjusting dividend policies, as noted by 
the catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004). According to Jain (1999), tax-exempt 
institutions tend to be neutral of dividend payments while the non-tax-exempt 
institutions may avoid firms with high levels of dividends when making investment 
decisions. Desai and Jin (2011) find that dividend-averse institutions, defined as 
independent investment advisors who have a clientele that consists primarily of high 
net worth individuals and hedge funds without tax exemptions, prefer low dividend-
paying firms, and that changes in the tax costs of institutional investors result in 
changes in the dividend policies of the firms they invest in. According to the signaling 
theory of Miller and Rock (1985), dividends are considered to signal managements’ 
private information regarding the firm’s future earnings. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) 
suggest that institutional shareholdings can serve as an alternative signaling method to 
dividend payments. Amihud and Li (2006) find that, consistent with the substitution 
effect, the role of dividends as a means of conveying information about the firm value 
11 
is smaller for the firms with more institutional holdings.  
 
2.3 Institutional background 
(Insert Figure 1) 
The stock markets in China have gone through dramatic changes during the past 
two decades. The percentage of listed firms that paid dividends to their stockholders 
was 48.39% in 2003 and this increased to 67.27% in 2011
2
, as shown in Figure 1. The 
average dollar amount of cash dividends per firm has grown from 94 million Chinese 
Yuan (CNY) in 2003 to 196 million CNY in 2011.  
Traditional agency theory focuses on the conflict between firm managers and a 
diversified group of shareholders. However, in many firms in China and other Asian 
and European countries, there arises another kind of agency problem derived from the 
risk of controlling shareholder expropriation of minority investors (Johnson et al., 
2000; Djankov et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010). There are many, and often subtle, ways 
that controlling shareholders can exert influences on the operations of the firms they 
own and thus can extract private benefits at the costs of minority shareholders. This is 
particularly true for the listed Chinese State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) due to the fact 
that the state ownership is highly concentrated and that the trading of shares owned by 
all levels of governments, state agencies and other legal entities are restricted. 
Although the split-share structure reform, which took place from 2005 to 2007, 
converted previously non-tradable shares often held by government agencies into 
tradable shares, there are still restrictions on their sales. First, the extensive lock-up 
periods were required which prevented the government agencies from dumping their 
shares into the market. Second, the government agencies still want to control the firm. 
                                                             
2
 By way of comparison, the percentage of firms paying cash dividends in 22 countries worldwide is 75% 
in the period 2003 to 2007 (Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
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Thus, agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders are unlikely to 
be fully resolved. In addition, the overall immature regulatory and legal mechanisms, 
and inadequate disclosure of financial information, make it hard for individual 
shareholders in China to directly monitor the managers and controlling shareholders. 
Therefore, institutional investors, who pool the investment of various individuals, 
become particularly important in helping strengthen the bargaining power of minority 
shareholders in the corporate governance process. 
Since 2000, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has made 
substantial regulatory efforts to develop financial institutions with the purposes that the 
institutional investors can improve the corporate governance of listed firms and 
stabilize the stock markets. The securities mutual funds, the largest institutional 
investors in China, have grown very fast since then. At the end of 2011, there were 66 
fund management companies managing 1,019 mutual funds. The total market value of 
equity held by mutual funds has increased rapidly over time and was over 1.04 trillion 
CNY (or 8.61% of all tradable A-shares in the market) at the end of 2011. On average, 
in my sample, the total mutual fund ownership for a firm is 5.6%, while the highest 
percentage reaches 66.5%
3
, suggesting that the financial institutions could exercise 
considerable influence in the listed firms where they have a large portion of ownership. 
The securities mutual fund industry in China is largely organized along the lines of 
those in the U.S. and other developed countries. Management fees depend on 
investment performance and fund size.
4
 The emphasis on stock performance and 
extensive competition puts pressure on mutual fund managers to make profitable 
investment decisions for the funds’ unit holders and to enhance the corporate 
                                                             
3
 This number 66.5% is the mutual fund ownership of the listed firm Zhongbai Group (stock code: 
000759) in year 2008, whose largest 10 shareholders include 9 mutual funds investors.  
4
 For open-end funds, investors can choose to withdraw at any time.  
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governance of the firms that they invest in. As found by Yuan et al. (2008), mutual 
fund ownership is associated with improved firm valuations.  
The other financial institutions, such as commercial banks, insurance companies 
and securities companies possess different characteristics from mutual funds and are 
considered to have limited monitoring roles, as indicated in the large body of literature 
that studies other countries (Chen et al., 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). The 
securities companies are the second biggest financial institutions which hold shares of 
listed firms but they normally have close business ties with listed firms in their 
capacity of being the underwriters of share issues and/or financial consultants. 
Therefore, to protect their business relations, securities companies are less willing to 
challenge management decisions (Brickley et al., 1988 and Cornett et al., 2007) and 
appear to be passive and less-effective in monitoring (Yuan et al., 2009). Similar to 
securities companies, banks and insurance companies also have various business 
relations with listed firms. Moreover, the equity ownerships of these financial 
institutions are limited. The means total percentage equity ownerships of banks and 
insurance companies per firm are 0.2% and 1.8%, respectively, for the year 2003 and 
2011. According to the Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(2003, Article 43), banks are forbidden to hold firms’ shares directly and actively. 
Therefore, the commercial banks in China only hold firm shares passively if the shares 
are collaterals for company loans. Insurance companies are subject to strict quotas for 
stock investment.  
(Insert Figure 2) 
In contrast, mutual funds do not have many business relations with listed firms. 
Following Chen et al. (2007), I investigate the effects of mutual fund ownership
5
 and 
                                                             
5
 Since 2003, certain foreign institutional investors are permitted to trade A-shares in Chinese stock 
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the ownership of BIS separately. The other institutions such as trust companies only 
have an extremely small ownership of listed firms and thus are not included in my 
analysis. Figure 2 shows the annual equity ownership of the different categories of 
institutions over time. The total investments of BIS are always dwarfed by those of 
mutual funds throughout my sample period. Panel B of Figure 2 shows the total market 
value of institutional ownership of listed firms. The change over time reflects changes 
in stock prices as well as the growth in the number of listed firms. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis  
Motivated by the monitoring hypothesis and Jensen (1986)’s agency theory, I 
examine the degree to which institutional equity ownerships affect dividend payments 
in China. Specifically, I hypothesize that:  
H1: Mutual fund ownership is positively related with dividend payments; and the 
BIS institutions with their limited monitoring abilities have no predictive power to 
explain dividend payments.  
According to Rozeff (1982), firms with higher agency costs have higher optimum 
dividend payouts. I further hypothesize that: 
H2: The monitoring effects of mutual fund ownership on dividend payments are 
more pronounced for firms with potentially more serious agency problems, i.e., the 
state-owned enterprises and firms with relatively higher free cash flows.  
Conceptually, mutual funds influence a firm’s management to increase dividend 
payments, in order to reduce agency costs and improve firm performance. To test these 
                                                                                                                                                                                
markets. As the qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) are considered closest to domestic mutual 
funds in terms of investment objectives and are more independent than banks, insurance companies, and 
securities companies, I include them in the mutual fund group when I conduct my tests. As the QFII 
investment overall is small in my sample period, my results are consistent if the QFII is excluded from 
the group of mutual funds.  
15 
conjectures, I perform additional analysis on the direct effects of mutual fund 
ownership on agency costs and firm performance and hypothesize that: 
H3: Mutual fund ownership can reduce agency costs and improve firm valuations.  
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Chapter 3. Data and Variables 
 
3.1 Sample selection   
To test the hypotheses posed in the previous chapter, I use firm-level institutional 
ownership and dividend data for a sample of firms listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period 2003-2011. Institutional ownership data are 
available from 2003 onwards and are obtained from WIND information system. 
Dividend and other accounting data are obtained from China Stock Market Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. I make several adjustments to my sample. First, the 
sample of listed firms does not contain financial companies (e.g., banks, securities 
companies, insurance companies and investment trusts) as these companies have 
different accounting rules, special financial policies, and are highly regulated. Second, 
firms in the sample must be listed for at least one full year and the firm-year 
observations with missing variable values are deleted. Third, variables defined as 
ratios are winsorized at the upper and lower 1%. After the above adjustments, 13,105 
firm-year observations are obtained. The total number of the firms varies from a 
minimum of 1,172 in 2003 to a maximum of 1,968 in 2011.   
 
3.2 Variables 
I use two measures of dividend as the dependent variable in my models. They are 
the total cash dividend per share during a year as in Short et al. (2002), denoted by DIV, 
and the firm’s decision to pay a cash dividend (Li and Zhao, 2008; Booth and Chang, 
2011), denoted by DIVDM, which is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm makes 
dividend payments in a year and otherwise zero. For each firm, I also measure the 
17 
change in dividend payments for two consecutive years, ΔDIV and ΔDIVDM. Some 
studies also use dividend payout ratio (Lintner, 1956), which is dividend over earnings, 
to measure dividend policies. I include earnings per share as a control variable instead 
and therefore do not use the dividend payout ratio as the dependent variable. To 
normalize the cash dividend payment and buttress my conclusions, dividend yield 
defined as cash dividend over book assets (DIVA) is used as a third measure of 
dividend policy in the robustness test. The measure of dividend yield (DIVA) follows 
the ideals suggested by Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Li and Zhao (2008).  
For the measurement of the effects of equity ownership, the institutional investors 
are separated into two categories. The first category is the mutual funds. Following 
Yuan et al. (2008), the ownership of them is measured by the ratio of common shares 
held by mutual funds at the year-end to a firm’s total number of shares, denoted by MF, 
and the ratio of the market value of mutual funds-held shares to the total market value 
of a firm (market value of equity plus book value of debt) at the year-end, denoted by 
MFMV. The second category includes the banks, insurance companies and securities 
companies. Their ownership is measured by the percentage of common shares held by 
these institutions at the year-end, denoted by BIS, and the ratio of the market value of 
shares held by these institutions to the total market value of a firm at the year-end, 
denoted by BISMV. According to Chen et al. (2007), Gaspar et al. (2005) and Attig et 
al. (2012), who all study institutional investors’ effects on other corporate governance 
aspects, the investment horizon is an important variable that reflects the mutual fund’s 
incentives to place pressure on firms it invests in. Short-term investors with high 
portfolio turnover should trade their shares frequently and may not have the incentives 
to enhance corporate governance, while the long-term and more stable institutional 
investors are more likely to improve the governance quality of the firms they invest in. 
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Thus, in a robustness test, mutual fund investment horizon (WACR) is considered as a 
factor that influence the mutual fund’s effects on dividend policy. 
Following the literature, I include other firm-specific characteristics as control 
variables. They are the growth opportunity measured by sales growth (GROWTH), 
ownership concentration estimated by the Herfindahl index of the top ten shareholders 
(HERF10), earnings per share (EPS), natural logarithm of total assets (LNASSET), 
managerial ownership (MAO), leverage measured as total liabilities over total assets 
(LEVE), return on assets (ROA), and daily stock return volatility (VOLATILITY). 
EPS is included because dividend paying capacity is often constrained by profits 
(Lintner, 1956; Brav et al. 2005). The free cash flow (FCF) is the ratio of net operating 
cash flows over total assets, following Fenn and Liang (2001). A dummy variable 
(SOE), which is coded one if a firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is the 
government or government agency and zero otherwise, is also included because some 
studies (Cheng et al., 2009; Xi et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2011; Bradford et al. , 2013) 
find that state ownership can greatly affect the dividend policy in China. In additional 
tests, I examine institutional investors’ influence on agency costs and firm performance. 
I follow Ang et al. (2000) and estimate the agency costs as operating expense scaled by 
annual sales. The industry-adjusted agency cost (AC), which is the difference between 
each firm’s agency costs and the median agency costs of the industry in a year, is used 
as dependent variable. Similarly, the industry adjusted return on assets (ROA) is used 
as a firm’s performance measure. Industry classification is according to the two-digit 
industry code provided by CSMAR database. The complete definitions of these 
variables are reported in the Appendix. 
 (Insert Table 1) 
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Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables. On 
average, a mutual fund and a BIS institution respectively hold 5.6% and 1.5% of a 
firm’s shares during the period from year 2003 to year 2011. Among the 13,105 
observations, about 52.9% (6,934) firm-year observations have cash dividend 
payments, and the average cash dividend payout is 0.156 CNY per share. On average, 
the dividend over firm size measured by book value of assets is 2.2%. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the mean values of key variables in double sorted 
subsamples. Here, I compare the key variables of SOEs versus non-SOEs and of 
dividend-paying firms versus non-dividend-paying firms. Although the proportion of 
SOEs with cash dividend payments (4,310 or 55%) is higher than then those of non-
SOEs with cash dividend payment (2,624 or 50%), the average amounts of cash 
dividends between SOEs and non-SOEs are not significantly different. So I do not find 
evidence in support of Chen et al. (2009), who suggest that SOEs tend to issue more 
cash dividends than non-SOEs because cash dividend distributions might be a way for 
state-dominated firms to expropriate minority shareholders. Similarly, there is no 
significant difference in the institutional ownership of SOEs and non-SOEs. What is 
consistently significant is the higher agency costs in SOEs than in non-SOEs. The 
agency costs are also significantly higher in non-dividend-paying firms than in 
dividend-paying firms. Meanwhile, the mutual fund ownership in dividend-paying 
firms is 0.063 which is also much higher than that in non-dividend-paying firms 
(0.018). These findings are consistent with my hypotheses that SOEs are more likely to 
suffer from agency problems than non-SOEs, and that dividend payment helps lower 
agency costs and mutual funds ownership are positively related with cash dividends. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients reported in Table 2 show that the measures of 
institutional ownership are all significantly and positively related with dividend 
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payments, DIV.  
(Insert Table 2) 
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Chapter 4. Regression Models  
 
4.1 The contemporary relation between institutional ownership and dividend policy  
Following Desai and Jin (2011), I use the Tobit and Fama-MacBeth regression 
models to test the contemporary relation between institutional ownership and dividend 
payments. The Tobit regression model is specified as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡(𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
eq.(1), 
where DIVi,t refers to the cash payment of firm i in year t, MFi,t and BISi,t are the  
ownerships of the two categories of institutional investors, and Controli,t represents the 
control variables specified earlier. Industry and year dummies are included.  
The Fama-MacBeth regression is a cross-sectional regression in each year. The 
model is the same as eq.(1) except that the year dummy variable is excluded. For each 
variable, the average of the annual coefficients is presented and the null hypothesis that 
the mean slope coefficient equals zero is tested by the t-statistics adjusted for 
autocorrelations in the annual coefficients. Regression models are also run by 
replacing MF and BIS by MFMV and BISMV, respectively.  As a second measure of 
dividend policy, the dummy variable DIVDM is used to replace DIV in both models to 
test whether institutional investors have any relation with the decision to pay cash 
dividends or not. When DIVDM is the dependent variable in eq.(1), the Tobin model is 
changed to a Probit model. 
 
4.2 Does institutional ownership cause dividend policy to change? 
The Tobit and Fama-MacBeth models are used to examine if there is any 
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contemporary relation between institutional stock ownership and dividends. In the 
following models, I further test whether institutional ownership can change future 
dividend payments or influence corporate decisions about paying cash dividends with 
the methodologies widely adopted in the literature (Yuan et al., 2008; Desai and Jin, 
2011; and Aggarwal et al., 2011). More specifically, I use the firm-fixed effect models 
that include the institutional investor’s variables lagged for one year relative to the 
dependent variable and that control for omitted (unobservable) heterogeneous firm-
specific effects.
6
 The fixed-effect regression model is specified as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1,𝑖+𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡        
eq.(2).  
In addition to the fixed-effect model, I also adopt the change models, for which 
changes in institutional ownerships from time t-2 to t-1 for firm i, ∆MFi,t-1, are used to 
explain the changes of dividends from time t-1 to t, ∆DIVi,t. This method is also used 
by Aggawal et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2011) to deal with the endogeneity problem. 
The regression with changes in variables is specified as follows: 
∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1+𝛼2∆𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1(∆𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (industry, year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
                           
eq.(3).
7
 
where ∆DIVi,t = DIVi,t - DIVi,t-1 , ∆MFi,t-1 = MFi,t-1 - MFi,t-2 and ∆BIS= BISi,t-1 - BISi,t-2. 
In addition to the effects on the payment amounts, I also expect that institutional 
investors can influence the firm’s decision whether to pay cash dividends or not in the 
next year. Therefore, DIVDMi,t and ∆DIVDMi,t are also used as the dependent 
                                                             
6
 The results from Hausman Tests suggest that it is more appropriate to use fixed effect models here than 
random effect models. 
7
 When DIVi,t-1 is already high, it might be difficult for the firm to increase dividends further. For the 
regression model of eq.(3), we also add  DIVi,t-1 as an explanatory variable for ∆DIVi,t and the estimated 
coefficient is negative and significant. The results for the other variables do not change much. 
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variables in eq.(2) and eq.(3), respectively, where DIVDMi,t is coded one if firm i has 
dividend payment in year t and otherwise zero, and ∆DIVDMi,t = DIVDMi,t - 
DIVDMi,t-1. 
As stated in the hypotheses, if institutions can influence firms’ decisions to make, 
or to increase, dividend payments under the motivation of reducing agency costs, I can 
further expect that this positive effect of institutions will be more pronounced for firms 
with higher agency costs. In the following sections, the above tests are conducted for 
different subsamples. 
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Chapter 5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Contemporary analysis between institutional ownership and dividend policy 
(Insert Table 3) 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of the Tobit and Fama-MacBeth regression 
models specified in eq.(1) using DIV as dependent variable. Columns 1-6 of Panel A 
report the results of Tobit regressions with the percentage of shares held by two 
different institutions (MF and BIS) as the main explanatory variables (columns 1-3), 
and with the ratio of the market value of institutional shareholdings (MFMV and 
BISMV) to the total market value of the firm at the year end as the main explanatory 
variables (columns 4-6). When including both MF and BIS institutions in the same 
regression (columns 1 and 4), the coefficients on BIS (and BISMV) do not seem to be 
related to cash dividend payments. On the contrary, the estimated coefficients on MF 
(and MFMV) are all significantly positive. Therefore, my results show that mutual 
fund ownership is positively associated with dividend payout while other institutional 
ownership has no significant relation with dividends. To control for the potential cross-
correlations in residuals, I use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology to run 
regressions for each year separately and report the Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-
statistics. In columns 7-12, the mutual funds are shown to be positively related with 
cash dividend payments while BIS institutions are not, consistent with the results from 
the Tobit regressions.  
The results in Panel A of Table 3 also show that higher free cash flows and 
earnings are associated with higher dividend payments while higher growth 
opportunities (sales growth) are associated with lower dividend payments. These 
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findings imply that firms with more free cash flows and fewer growth opportunities are 
more likely to increase dividend payments. In the following analysis in next section, I 
will test directly whether the free cash flow and growth opportunities can influence the 
effects of institutional ownership on dividend policy. Prior studies for other countries 
(e.g., Jensen et al., 1992; Chen and Steiner, 1999) indicate that managerial ownership 
is a substitute mechanism for dividend payments to reduce agency costs and there 
should be a negative relation between managerial ownership (MAO) and dividend 
policy. However, both Fenn and Liang (2001) and I find a positive relation between 
managerial ownership and dividend policy. Since managerial ownership is expected to 
mitigate the agency problem between shareholders and managers and align their 
interests, higher managerial ownership can prevent managers from taking value-
destroying activities and more cash flow can be saved to pay out as dividends. The 
significant and negative coefficients on leverage (LEVE) reinforce the conclusions by 
Jensen (1986) that debt can also be used as a substitution for cash dividends to reduce 
agency cost of free cash flow. 
In Panel B of Table 3, dividend dummy (DIVDM) is used to replace dividend per 
share (DIV) as the dependent variable. I run the Probit and Fama-MacBeth regressions 
respectively, and find similar results to those shown in Panel A. When both mutual 
funds and BIS institutions are included in the Probit models (column 1 and 4), the 
coefficients on mutual funds are all highly significant, but those on BIS are not. There 
is a positive relation between mutual funds ownership and the decision to pay cash 
dividend. 
 
5.2 Does institutional ownership drive changes in dividend policy? 
                                                  (Insert Table 4) 
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The contemporary analysis shows positive and significant coefficients on MF and 
MFMV in explaining dividend payments. Now I turn my attention to examine whether 
institutional ownership can influence future dividend decisions, using the firm-fixed 
effect regression specified in eq.(2) and the regression with changes in variables 
specified in eq.(3). Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of the fixed effect and change 
models when DIV is the dependent variable. In my analysis, the firm and year fixed 
effect models are used to control for the possibility that endogeneity arises from 
unobserved firm-specific time-invariant factors, which may be related to institutional 
shareholdings and dividend policy. All mutual fund variables are lagged one year 
relative to the dependent variables. The mutual fund shareholdings are highly 
significant, while BIS shareholdings are not significant in all columns. The results are 
not only statistically but also economically significant. In column 1 (and column 4), 
one standard deviation increase in MF (and MFMV) will increase DIV by 12.83% 
8
(and 12.99%) in the following year. The free cash flow (FCF) and earnings (EPS) are 
shown to be positively and significantly related to dividend payout.   
In columns 7-12 of Table 4, I observe that the coefficients on the changes of 
mutual fund ownership (∆MF and ∆MFMV) are also positive and highly significant9. 
In contrast, none of the coefficients on BIS institutional ownership (∆BIS and 
∆BISMV) are significant no matter whether two groups of institutions are examined 
separately or jointly in the models. Thus, the results on the changes analyses are 
overall consistent with those from the fixed effects regressions. 
Since the institutional investors are expected to influence not only the amount of 
dividend payments but also the firms’ decisions to pay dividends, I use an alternative 
                                                             
8
 I obtain this estimate by multiplying the value of the coefficient (0.130) by one standard deviation of 
MF (0.076) and then dividing by the average DIV (0.077). 
9
 Following Aggarwal et al. (2011), I also cluster the observations at the firm-level for the fixed effect 
models and the change models. The results are still consistent with those reported in table 4. 
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measure of dividend payments, DIVDM, which is coded one if a firm pays a dividend 
in a specific year, and zero otherwise, as the dependent variable, in the fixed-effect 
model of eq.(2) and the change model of eq.(3). I report the results in Panel B of Table 
4. Columns 1-6 present the results of the lagged institutional investor variables in the 
fixed-effect models, and columns 7-12 show the results of the lagged institutional 
variables in the change models. I observe that the results from the model estimations 
are highly consistent with the findings in Panel A. When including both MF and BIS in 
the regressions (columns 1, 4, 7 and 10), all the coefficients on the mutual fund 
variables (∆MF and ∆MFMV) are significantly positive while those of BIS institutions 
(∆BIS and ∆BISMV) are not statistically significant. These results show that mutual 
funds, unlike other institutional investors, can increase the likelihood of firms paying 
dividends. 
 
5.3 Effects of institutions on dividend policy in SOEs versus non-SOEs  
(Insert Table 5) 
Many firms in China are directly or indirectly owned by the government. The 
SOEs are considered to have higher agency costs than in the case for non-SOEs 
because, in addition to the agency problems between managers and shareholders, 
SOEs are also faced with the potential conflicts of interests between the state and the 
minority shareholders. I argue that the influence of institutional investors on dividend 
policies will be more pronounced in SOEs because of the higher and more complex 
agency costs. The regression models of eq.(2) and eq.(3) are run separately for SOEs 
and non-SOEs and Table 5 presents the results.   
In Panel A with DIV as the dependent variable, for both firm-fixed effect models 
and change models, I find that the estimated coefficients on mutual funds (MF, MFMV, 
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∆MF and ∆MFMV) are positively significant for SOEs, but are insignificant for the 
non-SOEs. I further show that the absolute values of the estimated coefficients on MF 
(0.151) and MFMV (0.132) for SOEs in Table 5 are higher than the corresponding 
figures (0.130 for MF and 0.115 for MFMV) for the whole sample in Table 4
10
, 
indicating that the effects of mutual funds in SOEs are stronger. According to the 
fixed-effects models in Panel A, in column 1 (and column 2), one standard deviation 
increase in MF (and MFMV) will respectively cause the DIV of an SOE to increase by  
13.84% (and 13.51%). I find similar results for SOEs in Panel B for both the firm-
fixed effects models and change models. Mutual funds can influence firms’ decisions 
to pay cash dividends and the effect is statistically significant for SOEs. For non-SOEs, 
the coefficients on mutual funds are significant for fixed-effect models (columns 5-6), 
but insignificant for change models (columns 7-8). The findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the monitoring effects of institutional investors on dividends are 
stronger in the firms with higher potential agency problems, i.e. SOEs. 
In both Panel A and Panel B, the BIS institutions are shown to have some positive 
effects on dividends for the non-SOEs and the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant and large in magnitude in some regressions. But the effects of BIS 
institutions are not consistent in change regressions and fixed effect regressions. It is 
not robust enough to make a strong conclusion about BIS institutions. Although the 
coefficients on BIS (BISMV) in regressions (7) and (8) are bigger than the coefficients 
on MF (MFMV) in regressions (3) and (4), it is because the value of BIS (BISMV) is 
much smaller than MF (MFMV), as showed in the summary statistics of Table 1, and 
does not mean that BIS institutions have stronger effect than mutual funds. In contrast, 
the estimated coefficients on the BIS variables are consistently insignificant for SOEs. 
                                                             
10
 The Chow-Test is conducted to compare the coefficients on the same variables in two different 
regressions and the test result indicates a significant difference between them. 
29 
This finding demonstrates that different institutional investors have different impacts 
on listed firms. The classifications of both institutional investors (MF versus BIS) and 
listed firms (SOEs versus Non-SOEs) are necessary when conducting the analysis on 
the effects of institutional stock ownerships. 
 
5.4 Can free cash flow enhance the effects of institutional ownership? 
The free cash flow theory postulated by Jensen (1986) suggests that agency costs 
may rise because of large free cash flows available to managers for value-destroying 
activities, especially when firms have fewer growth opportunities, and that paying cash 
dividend is an efficient way to reduce agency costs. If institutional investors monitor 
firms’ dividend policies, they would tend to lobby for increased cash dividends from 
the firms with relatively higher free cash flows. In order to examine this effect, for 
each year and industry, I run a cross-sectional regression of free cash flows (FCF) on 
Tobin’s Q, which is a proxy of growth opportunities (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; 
Denis, 1994; Jung et al., 1996). The firms with higher growth opportunities tend to 
retain more free cash flows and the regression residuals measure the part of the free 
cash flow that cannot be explained by the firm’s growth opportunities. A positive 
residual reflects a relatively higher free cash flow retained by the firm compared to its 
peers in the same industry. Thus, I define a dummy variable, FCFDM, which is coded 
one if the regression residual for a firm is positive and zero otherwise. The regression 
model of eq.(2) (and eq.(3)) is modified by adding an interaction term of FCFDM (and 
∆FCFDM) and institutional ownership and the results with DIV (and ∆DIV) as the 
dependent variable are presented in columns 1-2 (and columns 3-4) of Table 6. 
                                        (Insert Table 6) 
The estimated coefficients on the interaction term in columns 1 and 2, 
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MF*FCFDM (MFMV*FCFDM) are all positively significant while those of MF 
(MFMV) are no longer significant. Thus, the positive effect of MF on DIV only exists 
in the firms with positive FCFDMs. These results imply that mutual funds use their 
influence to press firms to distribute more cash dividends, if the firms have relatively 
higher free cash flows and lower investment opportunities, and thus inhibit the 
managers from overinvesting. In columns 5 and 6, the results of the models using 
DIVDM as dependent variable are overall consistent with the results of the models 
using DIV as dependent variable.  For the change models in columns 7 and 8, the 
estimated coefficients on the interaction term are not significant at the 10% level but 
are still positive. 
In an untabulated test, I also divide the firms into two groups according to the 
ratio of free cash flow to Tobin’s Q. In each year and industry, if a firm has a free-cash 
flow to Tobin’s Q ratio greater than the cross-sectional median, the firm is considered 
to have relatively higher potential for agency problems, and otherwise lower. When the 
two groups of firms are tested separately, I find the coefficients on mutual fund 
ownership in firms with higher ratios of free cash flow over Tobin’s Q are statistically 
higher and more significant than those with lower ratios of free cash flow over Tobin’s 
Q.  
  
5.5 Additional analysis: Effects of institutional ownership on agency costs and firm 
performance 
Prior literature tests the monitoring effects of institutional investors by measuring 
their impact on firm performance and finds a positive relation between them. I expect 
that mutual funds help to reduce a firm’s agency costs through their pressure on the 
firm to increase cash dividends, as observed in previous sections. As a supplementary 
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analysis, I directly test whether institutional investors help reduce agency costs and 
which category of institutional investor is the most effective in monitoring firms. In the 
following analysis, I follow Ang et al. (2000) and define agency cost as the operating 
expense scaled by annual sales. I use a firm’s agency cost minus its industry median to 
get the industry-adjusted agency cost (AC) and use it as the dependent variable. The 
effects of institutional ownerships on agency costs for SOEs and non-SOEs are 
examined separately. In addition to the control variables used by Yuan et al. (2008), I 
also include the number of directors (DIRECTORS), number of independent directors 
(INDEP), and the duality of CEO and chairman (DUA), because these board 
characteristics are widely considered by the literature to be related with agency costs 
and firm valuations (Yermack, 1996; Brickley et al., 1997; Boone et al., 2007; Cheng, 
2008). More detailed definitions of these variables can be found in the Appendix.   
(Insert Table 7) 
The results from the full sample (columns 1-4), the SOE sample (columns 5-8), 
and non-SOE sample (columns 9-12) are all provided in Table 7. For each sample, I 
use both firm-fixed effect models of eq.(2) and change models of eq.(3) and replace 
the dependent variable by agency costs. The negative and significant estimated 
coefficients on MF, MFMV, ∆MF, and ∆MFMV imply that institutional investors can 
reduce agency costs
11
. The negative effects of mutual fund share ownership on agency 
costs are stronger in SOEs than in non-SOEs. The results related to BIS institutions are 
mixed and appear to have insignificant impact on agency costs in all the change 
regressions.  
With the large body of literature studying institutional ownership and firm 
                                                             
11
 One concern is that the regression results are driven by the negative effect of agency costs on 
institutions’ investment preferences. According to the reverse regression results in Table 8 (discussed 
later), the estimated coefficients of ∆AC are not statistically significant in explaining ∆MF or ∆MFMV. 
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performance, I also estimate regressions with industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) 
as the dependent variable. Table 8 shows the regression results of eq.(2) and eq.(3) 
when the dependent variable is replaced by industry-adjusted ROA. Consistent with 
the prior literature (Yuan et al., 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011), the estimated coefficients 
on mutual funds in Table 8 (both the firm fixed-effect model and change model) are 
significantly positive in explaining firm valuation, especially in SOEs. Meanwhile, the 
coefficients on BIS ownership are not significant in most regressions. The results are 
overall consistent when ROA is replaced by operating profit over total assets, which is 
used as firm performance measure by Yuan et al. (2008) and Anderson and Reeb 
(2003). The results using operating profit over total assets are not tabulated. 
 (Insert table 8) 
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Chapter 6. Robustness tests 
 
6.1 Reverse regression: Do changes in dividend policy and changes in agency cost 
drive the changes in institutional ownership? 
 (Insert Table 9) 
The endogeneity problem that arises from unobserved and omitted factors has 
been mitigated by using the firm-fixed effect models in my above analysis. Another 
important concern is that institutional investors may alter their portfolios according to 
the changes of firms’ dividend policy. I conduct change regressions (or the first-
difference regressions) in the reverse direction to examine if firms with increasing 
dividend payments or decreasing agency costs can cause institutional investors to buy 
more shares. This methodology to deal with the endogeneity problem has been widely 
adopted in the literature (Aggarwal, 2011; Desai and Jin, 2011; Li et al., 2011). 
Changes in dividend payments and agency costs from time t-2 to t-1 are used to 
explain changes in institutional ownership from time t-1 to t. The dependent variables 
are institutional ownership (each of ∆MF, ∆MFMV, ∆BIS and ∆BISMV) multiplied by 
100 because the values of institutional ownership is small.  
Table 9 reports the results of the reverse change regressions using the full sample. 
Columns 1-4 report the impact of the amount of cash dividends (∆DIV) on the 
dependent variable. Columns 5-8 test whether mutual funds and other institutions 
prefer to invest in dividend-paying firms (∆DIVDM). The estimated coefficients on 
∆DIV and ∆DIVDM in explaining the changes in mutual fund ownerships (∆MF and 
∆MFMV) are statistically insignificant (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6). Therefore, dividend 
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policy is not a major issue in explaining mutual funds’ investment decisions in China.12 
However, the coefficient estimates on ∆DIV and ∆DIVDM are significantly positive in 
explaining BIS institutional ownership (columns 3, 4, 7 and 8), indicating that the BIS 
investors increase their investment in firms with increasing dividend payments. A 
plausible reason for this finding is that most BIS investors are not active in the 
investment market, and sometimes their investment policies are highly constrained. 
Therefore, BIS investors may prefer the firms with non-zero dividend policies. The 
estimated coefficients on industry-adjusted agency costs (AC) are not significant in 
any column, indicating that the decreasing agency costs of listed firms can influence 
neither mutual funds nor other institutional investors’ investment changes. Overall, the 
evidence supports the notion that the causation effect is from mutual funds to 
dividends but not from dividends to mutual funds, and that firms with increasing 
dividend payments do cause BIS institutions invest more.  
       In unreported results, the endogeneity concern between firm performance (ROA) 
and institutional ownership is also tested. I use industry-adjusted return on assets 
(ROA) from time t-2 to t-1 to explain changes in institutional ownership from time t-1 
to t and find the coefficients on ROA are not significant for both mutual fund and BIS 
ownership measures, suggesting that firms with increasing operating performance lead 
to neither mutual funds nor BIS institutions’ investment changes.   
  
6.2 Instrumental variable estimations 
                                             (Insert Table 10) 
An alternative way to address the potential endogeneity problem of mutual funds’ 
                                                             
12
 I run the same regressions with changes in institutional ownership as the dependent variable for SOEs 
only and find that the estimated coefficients on ∆AC, ∆DIV and ∆DIVDM are insignificant in 
explaining ∆MF and ∆MFMV. 
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ownership with respect to dividend payments is to use instrumental-variable estimation. 
Following the approaches used by Yuan et al. (2008), and similar approaches adopted 
by Aggarwal (2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2008), I use the membership in the 
Shanghai 180 Index and the Shenzhen Component Index as the first instrument for 
mutual fund ownership. A dummy variable (INDEX) is defined to take the value of 
one if a firm is included in either index in a year and zero otherwise. A firm’s 
membership in these indexes depends on the market capitalization, stock trading 
liquidity and the market position of a firm in its industry. Therefore, the inclusion of a 
firm in an index can attract institutional investors due to higher liquidity. The other 
instrument for the mutual fund ownership is the ratio of tradable A-shares over the 
total number of shares (PROA). Firms with more tradable A-shares are more likely to 
be invested in by mutual funds.
13
 The index membership and the proportion of tradable 
shares of a firm as determinants of mutual funds’ ownership are unlikely to be 
systematically related with the firm’s dividend policies. 
I use the standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) tests to mitigate the endogeneity 
problem. In the first-stage regressions, mutual fund ownership (each of MF and 
MFMV) is used as the dependent variable and the explanatory variables include all the 
control variables used in Table 3, industry dummies and year dummies. The 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The results shown in columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 10 support the view that the mutual fund ownership is positively associated with 
the proportion of tradable A-shares and index membership. F-tests reported at the 
bottom of first stage indicate that the hypotheses that instruments can be excluded 
from the first-stage regressions are strongly rejected. In the second-stage regression, 
                                                             
13
 Before the split-share reform that began in 2005, about two-thirds of the A shares are non-tradable 
shares owned mainly by the Chinese government, its affiliated bodies and legal persons. Institutional 
and individual investors can only hold the tradable shares. After the reform, the formerly non-tradable 
shares were subject to staggered lock-up periods that lasted several years. 
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the predicted value of mutual fund’s ownership from the first stage are then used in the 
main fixed-effect model specified by eq. (2) to replace the original mutual funds’ 
ownership variables. The regression results are presented in columns 1-4 of Table 10. 
Comparing the results from Table 10 and the corresponding results in Table 4, the 
coefficient estimates are still positive and remain significant. Therefore, my findings 
on the positive impact of mutual funds’ ownership on dividends are robust to the 
instrumental variable estimations. 
 
6.3 Institutional investment horizon 
                                                     (Insert Table 11) 
According to the literature (Gaspar et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Attig et al., 
2012), in addition to the institutional investors’ holding volume, the investment 
horizons are also important factors related to institutions’ monitoring effects. Short-
term investors should trade their shares frequently and may not have the incentives to 
enhance corporate governance of the firms they invest in, while the long-term 
institutional investors are more likely to improve the governance quality for the 
benefits of all outside shareholders. Both Chen et al. (2007) and Attig et al. (2012) find 
that institutional investors with longer investment horizons have greater incentives and 
efficiencies to engage in effective monitoring. To identify the mutual fund investment 
horizon, I follow the Gaspar et al. (2005) method to compute the “churn rate”, which 
measures the speed of mutual fund investors’ portfolio adjustment. A higher churn rate 
indicates a shorter investment horizon and a lower churn rate indicates a longer 
investment horizon. 
To be specific, the churn rate (CR) of the investments of mutual fund f at quarter 
q is calculated as follows:  
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           CRf,q =
∑ |Si,f,qPi,q−Si,f,q−1Pi,q−1−Si,f,q−1∆Pi,q
Nf,q
i=1
|
∑ (Si,f,qPi,q+Si,f,q−1Pi,q−1
Nf,q
i=1
)/2
,                             eq.(4) 
where Si,f,q is the number of shares of firm i held by mutual fund investors f at quarter 
q, Pi,q is the stock price of firm i at quarter q, Nf,q is the number of firms invested in by 
investor f at quarter q. Then the annual average churn rate of investor f in year t, ACRf,t , 
is the mean of the quarterly estimates of CRf,q  during a year.  
         The proxy of mutual fund investment horizon for firm i in year t is the weighted 
average churn rate of the firm’s all mutual fund investors:  
                                          WACRi,t = ∑ wi,f,tACRf,t
Mi,t
f=1                                              
eq.(5) 
where w𝑖,𝑓,t is the proportion of shares of firm i held by investor f  in year t, and Mi,t is 
the number of mutual fund investors of firm i in year t.  
Following Attig et al. (2012), I use an interaction item of mutual fund ownership 
(MF and MFMV) and mutual fund investment horizon (WACR) to test the effects of 
WACR. The fixed-effect model is specified as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1,𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 +Dummy (year) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
eq.(6) 
  As the main analysis suggests that BIS institutions do not influence the dividend 
policy, I only use the investment horizon of mutual funds here. Eq.(6) is also run by 
replacing DIV and MF by DIVDM and MFMV, respectively. The regression results of 
eq.(6) for the full sample (columns 1-4), SOE sample (columns 5-8), and Non-SOE 
sample (columns 9-12) are presented in Table 11. All independent variables are lagged 
by one year. The estimated coefficients on the interaction term MF*WACR 
(MFMV*WACR) are all significantly negative in the full sample and SOE sample, 
with the coefficients on mutual fund ownership (MF and MFMV) remaining 
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significantly positive. The results suggesting that a shorter investment horizon (higher 
churn rate) will reduce the effects of mutual fund ownership on dividend policy, which 
is consistent with the extant literature that institutional investors with longer 
investment horizons are more likely to play a role in corporate governance. For non-
SOEs, the results are consistent when DIVDM is the dependent variable (columns 11 
and 12). When DIV is the dependent variable, the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction term are not significant but do have negative signs (columns 9 and 10).  
 
6.4 Large mutual fund ownership 
         (Insert Table 12) 
The roles of institutional investors may be limited if the shareholding volume is 
too small. Hence I select only the mutual fund investors with large shareholdings to 
construct the mutual fund ownership. Similar to the approach used by Chen et.al (2007) 
and Li et.al (2011), a firm’s large mutual fund ownership (LMF) is defined as the 
aggregate shareholdings of those mutual fund investors who each own at least 1% or 
more of the firm’s total number of shares. By using LMF to replace the MF (MFMV) 
in model eq.(2) and eq.(3), I run the firm-fixed effects regressions and change 
regressions for the full sample, the SOE sample and the non-SOE sample separately 
and the results are provided in Table 12. The coefficients on LMF are all positively 
significant in the full sample and SOEs, consistent with the corresponding results 
presented in table 4 and table 5 when I use all the mutual funds shareholdings as the 
explanatory variable. 
 
6.5 Another measure of dividend policy: dividend yield 
                                                        (Insert Table 13) 
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As cash dividend per share (DIV) may change with inflation every year and may 
not reflect corporate dividend policy properly, to further alleviate the concern and 
consolidate my findings, I introduce dividend yield  as a third measure of dividend 
policy to repeat the analysis for the full sample, SOE sample and non-SOE sample. 
Since dividend payout ratios (cash dividend over earnings) sometimes are negative due 
to negative annual earnings, I use dividend yield defined as the amount of cash 
dividends divided by book assets, following Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Li and 
Zhao (2008). DIVA is used to replace DIV in the fixed-effect model of eq.(2) and the 
change model of eq.(3). The results are provided in Table 13 (columns 1-4 for the full 
sample, columns 5-8 for SOE sample and columns 9-12 for the non-SOE sample). The 
coefficients on MF and MFMV are all significantly positive in the full sample and the 
SOE sample, while they are not significant in the non-SOE sample. For BIS 
institutions, none of the coefficients in the full sample and the SOE sample is 
significant, while the coefficients are significant in the non-SOE sample for the change 
models. These findings are consistent with the results when DIV and DIVDM are used 
as dependent variables. Mutual fund investors can lead firms to increase dividend 
payments, mainly in SOEs, while the BIS institutions have no effects on SOEs but do 
seem to have some influence on the dividend policy for non-SOEs. 
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Chapter 7.  Conclusions 
 
By investigating the empirical relation between institutional investors and 
dividend policies in China from 2003 to 2011, I find that mutual fund ownership can 
cause firms to increase cash dividends and to initiate cash dividends, especially for 
those firms that are more likely to suffer from agency problems (State-owned 
enterprises and firms with relatively high free cash flows). However, the other 
financial institutional investors including banks, insurance companies and securities 
companies do not appear to have the same effects. Furthermore, changes of dividend 
policies of listed firms do not cause the changes of mutual fund ownership, but do 
cause the changes of BIS institutional ownership.  
My findings suggest that different categories of institutional investors may have 
different effects on the dividend policy of the firms that they invest in. To the best of 
my knowledge, my study is the first time to distinguish between the differential effects 
of institutional investors on firms’ dividend policies. Based on a variety of tests, my 
study contributes to the literature by carefully examining the causality effects of 
institutional investors’ stock holdings on dividend payments.  
Since the agency costs theory indicates that payment of cash dividends can reduce 
a firm’s agency costs of free cash flow, I test directly whether institutional ownership 
and cash dividend can reduce agency costs. My empirical results support Jensen’s 
agency costs theory, and show that mutual funds can reduce agency costs and improve 
firm performance. To the best of my knowledge, my thesis is the first to establish a 
direct link between different categories of institutional investors and dividend 
payments in China. This research provides evidence consistent with the monitoring 
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effects of institutional investors on corporate governance and the agency costs theory.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions  
Variable Sign Definition 
Institutional ownership MF, BIS Number of shares held by institutional investors 
over a firm’s total number of shares.  
Institutional ownership MFMV, BISMV Market value of institutional shareholding over a 
firm’s total market value. A firm’s total market value 
is calculated as sum of the market value of equity 
and book value of debt. Values of non-tradable 
shares are calculated as net assets per share 
multiplied by number of non-tradable shares. 
Mutual fund 
investment horizon 
WACR Weighted average churn rate of a firm’s all mutual 
fund investors.  See the details in chapter 6.3. 
Large mutual fund 
ownership 
LMF Aggregate ownership of a firm’s mutual fund 
investors who each hold at least 1% of  the firm’s 
total number of shares. 
Dividend payout DIV Cash dividend per share paid in a year. 
Dividend dummy DIVDM Dummy variable which equals one if a firm pays 
cash dividend (DIV>0) and zero otherwise. 
Dividend to assets DIVA Dividend per share over book assets per share. 
Free cash flow FCF Net operating cash flow (calculated as earnings 
before interests, taxes and depreciation, or EBITDA, 
less capital expenditure) over total assets. 
Free cash flow dummy FCFDM Constructed from running a cross-sectional 
regression of firms’ free cash flows (FCF) on 
Tobin’s Q for each year and each industry. If the 
regression residual for a firm is positive then 
FCFDM equals one, and zero otherwise.  
Growth opportunity GROWTH Annual percentage change in sales.  
Ownership 
Concentration 
HERF10 Sum of the squared percentage of shares held by the 
largest 10 shareholders. 
State owned enterprise SOE A dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate 
controlling shareholder of a firm is the central 
government, local government or government 
agency, zero otherwise.  
Earnings per share EPS Net profits over total number of shares.  
Log of assets LNASSET Natural logarithm of total assets.  
Managerial ownership MAO Shares held by senior managers over the firm’s total 
number of shares. 
Leverage LEVE Total liabilities over total assets. 
Return on assets ROA Net profit over total assets.  
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Figure 2 Institutional ownership in China 
 
Panel A shows the annual percentage stock ownership of institutional investors, which is the 
market value of stocks held by institutional investors over the market value of tradable A-
shares of listed firms, from 2003 to 2011. Panel B shows the annual total market value (in 
trillion CNY) of institutional ownership from 2003 to 2011. MF refers to domestic mutual 
funds and QFII. BIS refers to other institutional investors including banks, insurance 
companies and securities companies. Total is the sum of MF and BIS.  
 
Panel A: Percentage institutional ownership 
 
 
Panel B: The market value of institutional ownership (in trillion CNY) 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
The table shows descriptive statistics of the main firm-year variables for the period from 2003 to 2011. MF and BIS are the percentages of shares held by mutual 
funds and BIS institutional investors, respectively, over the firm’s total number of shares. MFMV and BISMV is market value of mutual funds and BIS 
institutional shareholdings, respectively, over the total market value of a firm at year end. DIV is cash dividend per share. FCF is the net operating cash flow over 
total assets. GROWTH is the annual percentage change in sales. HERF10 is the sum of the squared percentage of shares held by the top ten shareholders. SOE is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is the government or government agency, and zero otherwise. EPS is net profits over 
total number of shares. LNASSET is natural logarithm of total assets. MAO is number of shares owned by senior managers over the firm’s total number of 
shares. LEVE is total liabilities over total assets. ROA is net profit over total assets. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during a year. 
AC is the industry-adjusted expense ratio (annual operating expenses scaled by sales). The other variables are defined in appendix. Panel A shows the descriptive 
statistics of the main variables, where * refers to the number of non-zero observations. Panel B shows the mean values of DIV, MF, BIS and AC in subsamples 
divided in two dimensions, SOEs versus non-SOEs and dividend-paying versus non-dividend-paying firms. The null hypothesis that the difference in subsample 
means is zero is tested via a two-tailed t-test. The t-statistics of SOEs versus non-SOEs are reported in the rows and those of dividend-paying versus non-dividend-
paying firms are in the columns. *, **, *** in Panel B indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. All the values are rounded to three decimal 
places. 
 
Panel A Descriptive statistics of main variables 
 
Variables 
Number of  
observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile Maximum 
MF 9,816* 0.056  0.084  0.000  0.002  0.018  0.076  0.665  
BIS 4,552* 0.015  0.025  0.000  0.004  0.009  0.019  0.584  
MFMV 9,816* 0.057  0.094  0.000  0.001  0.014  0.070  0.669  
BISMV 4,552* 0.015  0.024  0.000  0.003  0.008  0.019  0.491  
LMF 4,247* 0.062 0.058 0.010 0.021 0.044 0.082 0.509 
WACR 9,816* 0.066 0.099 0.000 0.002 0.021 0.090 0.798 
DIV 6,934* 0.156  0.173  0.004  0.056  0.100  0.200  3.997  
DIVDM 13,105 0.529 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DIVA 6.934* 0.021 0.021 0.000 0.007 0.014 0.026 0.262 
FCF 13,105 0.047  0.084  -0.220  0.003  0.047  0.094  0.280  
GROWTH 13,105 0.246  0.628  -0.786  0.001  0.156  0.342  4.593  
HERF10 13,105 0.185  0.127  0.015  0.086  0.153  0.261  0.563  
SOE 13,105 0.599  0.490  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
EPS 13,105 0.233  0.439  -1.405  0.050  0.182  0.408  1.820  
LNASSET 13,105 21.494  1.182  18.744  20.700  21.377  22.156  25.121  
MAO 13,105 0.017  0.067  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.436  
LEVE 13,105 0.523  0.276  0.059  0.358  0.512  0.647  2.050  
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ROA 13,105 0.026  0.082  -0.432  0.010  0.032  0.060  0.211  
VOLATILITY 13,105 0.032  0.029  0.000  0.024  0.029  0.036  1.636  
AC 12,722 -0.011 0.141 -0.468 -0.083 0.002 0.072 0.345 
LPO 12,722 0.023 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.471 
FORO 12,722 0.036 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.477 
TANG 12,722 0.457 0.180 0.049 0.327 0.455 0.589 0.855 
SIZE 12,722 20.854 1.577 7.125 19.962 20.835 21.719 28.550 
ADJR 12,722 0.130 0.657 -1.102 -0.202 -0.018 0.270 3.013 
DUA 12,722 0.850 0.357  0.000  1.000  1.000   1.000   1.000 
INDEP 12,722 0.356 0.054  0.000  0.333  0.333  0.375  0.800  
DIRECTOR 12,722 9.319 1.968  3.000  9.000 9.000  10.000  19.000  
 
 
Panel B Mean values of key variables in double sorted subsamples 
  
MEAN VALUES SOEs Non-SOEs Row T-TEST ALL 
DIV 
Firms without dividend 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Firms with dividend 0.155  0.157  -0.22 0.156  
Column T-TEST 
    ALL 0.085  0.078  2.86*** 0.082  
MF 
Firms without dividend 0.018  0.018  -0.21 0.018  
Firms with dividend 0.062  0.066  -1.51 0.063  
Column T-TEST -28.08*** -23.65*** 
 
-36.71*** 
ALL 0.042  0.042  0.31 0.042  
BIS 
Firms without dividend 0.004  0.003  3.15*** 0.004  
Firms with dividend 0.006  0.007  -1.04 0.006  
Column T-TEST -4.35*** -11.39*** 
 
-9.11*** 
ALL 0.005  0.005  2.19** 0.005  
AC 
Firms without dividend 0.036  -0.010 11.76*** 0.016  
Firms with dividend -0.020  -0.060  11.69*** -0.035 
Column T-TEST 19.11*** 11.89*** 
 
20.84*** 
ALL 0.005  -0.035 15.21*** -0.011  
OBSERVATIONS 
Firms without dividend 3,536  2,635  
 
6,171  
Firms with dividend 4,310  2,624  
 
6,934  
ALL 7,846  5,259  
 
13,105  
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Table 2 Correlation analysis 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients. DIV is cash dividend per share. MF and BIS are the numbers of shares held by mutual funds and BIS 
institutional investors respectively over the firm’s total number of shares. MFMV and BISMV are market values of mutual funds and BIS institutional 
shareholdings respectively over the total market value of a firm at year end. The other variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels.  
 
Variable DIV MF BIS MFMV BISMV FCF GROWTH HERF10 SOE EPS LNASSET MAO LEVE ROA 
MF 0.311***  
            BIS 0.064*** 0.150*** 
            MFMV 0.355*** 0.917*** 0.127*** 
           BISMV 0.102*** 0.164*** 0.946*** 0.188*** 
          FCF 0.247*** 0.189*** 0.028*** 0.213*** 0.054*** 
         GROWTH 0.071*** 0.223*** 0.012 0.072*** 0.019** 0.074*** 
        HERF10 0.192*** 0.062*** -0.002 -0.015* 0.020** 0.094*** 0.094*** 
       SOE 0.024*** -0.063*** 0.018** -0.029*** -0.007 0.079*** -0.012 0.258*** 
      EPS 0.553*** 0.003 0.104*** 0.443*** 0.135*** 0.263*** 0.222*** 0.158*** 0.011 
     LNASSET 0.245*** 0.439*** 0.096*** 0.182*** 0.045*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.270*** 0.286*** 0.345*** 
    MAO 0.115*** 0.280*** 0.004 0.112*** 0.042*** -0.052*** 0.015* -0.074*** -0.282*** 0.129*** -0.114*** 
   LEVE -0.210*** 0.048*** -0.037*** -0.160*** -0.089*** -0.157*** -0.006 -0.094*** 0.018** -0.295*** 0.017* -0.192*** 
  ROA 0.362*** -0.085*** 0.080*** 0.326*** 0.118*** 0.297*** 0.214*** 0.137*** 0.002 0.791*** 0.215*** 0.111*** -0.464*** 
 VOLATILITY -0.045*** 0.291*** -0.023** 0.007 -0.016* -0.002 0.154*** -0.010 -0.038*** -0.004 -0.058*** 0.002 0.022** 0.019** 
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Table 3 Contemporary relation between institutional ownership and dividend policy 
The table presents the results of the regression models that use institutional ownerships to explain dividend policy. The model of Tobit regression (results shown in 
columns 1-6) is specified as: 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡(𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; and the model of Fama-MacBeth type regression 
(results shown in columns 7-12) is specified as: 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖(𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖) + 𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦) + 𝜀𝑖. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the 
cash dividend per share DIV, and in Panel B, the dependent variable is the dummy DIVDM, which is coded one if the firm pays cash dividends in a year and zero 
otherwise. The variable definitions are the same as those in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistices. For the Fama-MacBeth regressions, the 
Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are reported. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  Inclusion of industry dummies and year 
dummies are indicated by “YES” or “NO”. 
 
Panel A Relation of institutional ownerships and DIV 
 
                                                                                          Tobit                                                                                                                               Fama-MacBeth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV  DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV 
MF 0.080*** 0.082***      0.264* 0.265*     
 (3.47) (3.53)      (2.26) (2.23)     
BIS 0.046  0.080     0.054  0.133*    
 (0.47)  (0.83)     (0.74)  (1.87)    
MFMV    0.088*** 0.090***      0.291*** 0.294***  
    (4.26) (4.41)      (3.71) (3.63)  
BISMV    0.089  0.143     0.101  0.292*** 
    (0.89)  (1.44)     (1.37)  (4.95) 
FCF 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.151***  0.171*** 0.171*** 0.187*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.186*** 
 (6.38) (6.38) (6.68) (6.34) (6.34) (6.68)  (4.49) (4.46) (5.34) (4.28) (4.28) (5.29) 
GROWTH -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***  -0.008** -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* 
 (-4.70) (-4.70) (-4.74) (-4.74) (-4.75) (-4.74)  (-2.34) (-2.30) (-2.13) (-2.18) (-2.14) (-2.13) 
HERF10 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.125*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.125***  0.112*** 0.112*** 0.099*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.099*** 
 (9.49) (9.48) (8.98) (9.42) (9.44) (8.96)  (8.18) (8.09) (6.52) (6.09) (6.19) (6.23) 
SOE -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004  -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.05)  (-1.52) (-1.50) (-1.44) (-1.40) (-1.39) (-1.42) 
EPS 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.297*** 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.297***  0.214*** 0.214*** 0.232*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.231*** 
 (38.28) (38.28) (39.98) (38.56) (38.55) (39.97)  (31.10) (31.52) (36.42) (31.11) (31.13) (36.13) 
LNASSET 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036***  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
 (18.02) (18.05) (18.87) (18.38) (18.39) (18.91)  (4.58) (4.53) (4.57) (3.73) (3.75) (4.51) 
MAO 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.182***  0.163** 0.164** 0.172** 0.150** 0.151** 0.170** 
 (7.42) (7.41) (7.41) (7.19) (7.18) (7.39)  (2.52) (2.50) (2.59) (2.39) (2.35) (2.62) 
LEVE -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.233*** -0.229*** -0.229*** -0.232***  -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.041** -0.041** -0.045*** 
 (-22.36) (-22.36) (-22.42) (-22.01) (-22.05) (-22.36)  (-3.64) (-3.64) (-3.79) (-3.33) (-3.34) (-3.74) 
ROA 0.437*** 0.438*** 0.454*** 0.414*** 0.415*** 0.451***  -0.463*** -0.464*** -0.502*** -0.471*** -0.471*** -0.503*** 
 (7.14) (7.16) (7.42) (6.72) (6.76) (7.36)  (-16.35) (-16.26) (-11.77) (-15.06) (-15.06) (-11.75) 
VOLATILITY -0.557*** -0.557*** -0.575*** -0.553*** -0.554*** -0.574***  -0.405** -0.417** -0.434* -0.408** -0.421** -0.431* 
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 (-4.36) (-4.36) (-4.47) (-4.32) (-4.33) (-4.47)  (-2.44) (-2.40) (-2.21) (-2.53) (-2.48) (-2.22) 
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES YES YES  NO NO NO NO NO NO 
OBSERVATIONS 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105  13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 
(PSEUDO )R2 0.399 0.399 0.396 0.400 0.400 0.396  0.406 0.406 0.396 0.412 0.412 0.397 
 
Panel B Relation of institutional ownerships and DIVDM 
Probit                                                                                                                              Fama-MacBeth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM  DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM 
MF 1.194*** 1.184***      0.740*** 0.756***     
 (5.31) (5.29)      (4.89) (5.06)     
BIS -0.358  -0.005     0.698  1.000**    
 (-0.49)  (-0.01)     (1.76)  (2.35)    
MFMV    0.757*** 0.742***      0.529*** 0.550***  
    (3.58) (3.53)      (5.02) (5.20)  
BISMV    -0.506  -0.191     0.730*  1.101** 
    (-0.64)  (-0.24)     (1.87)  (2.56) 
FCF 0.358** 0.359** 0.433** 0.386** 0.386** 0.433**  0.160*** 0.159*** 0.224*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.221*** 
 (2.01) (2.01) (2.44) (2.17) (2.17) (2.44)  (3.51) (3.51) (5.72) (3.46) (3.42) (5.75) 
GROWTH -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.111*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.111***  -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
 (-4.78) (-4.77) (-4.87) (-4.83) (-4.83) (-4.87)  (-1.67) (-1.65) (-1.59) (-1.61) (-1.58) (-1.59) 
HERF10 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.710*** 0.748*** 0.746*** 0.710***  0.350*** 0.345*** 0.298*** 0.311*** 0.309*** 0.292*** 
 (6.85) (6.85) (6.12) (6.42) (6.41) (6.12)  (11.12) (11.26) (12.86) (11.78) (12.30) (12.64) 
SOE -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007  -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** -0.017** -0.017** -0.018** 
 (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.24) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.24)  (-2.89) (-2.93) (-2.72) (-2.71) (-2.75) (-2.72) 
EPS 1.421*** 1.421*** 1.532*** 1.467*** 1.466*** 1.533***  0.416*** 0.417*** 0.474*** 0.430*** 0.431*** 0.473*** 
 (16.69) (16.69) (18.48) (17.32) (17.31) (18.49)  (7.05) (7.01) (7.21) (6.90) (6.88) (7.19) 
LNASSET 0.376*** 0.376*** 0.393*** 0.385*** 0.385*** 0.393***  0.076*** 0.076*** 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.085*** 
 (23.30) (23.31) (24.76) (24.13) (24.13) (24.80)  (17.83) (17.34) (20.29) (20.53) (20.35) (19.65) 
MAO 1.797*** 1.798*** 1.801*** 1.770*** 1.769*** 1.801***  0.773*** 0.771*** 0.810*** 0.750*** 0.750*** 0.805*** 
 (7.72) (7.73) (7.74) (7.59) (7.59) (7.74)  (4.61) (4.52) (4.55) (4.59) (4.43) (4.60) 
LEVE -1.741*** -1.741*** -1.759*** -1.732*** -1.731*** -1.760***  -0.252*** -0.253*** -0.254*** -0.245*** -0.248*** -0.253*** 
 (-21.64) (-21.64) (-21.92) (-21.47) (-21.46) (-21.92)  (-7.80) (-7.81) (-8.01) (-7.48) (-7.54) (-7.93) 
ROA 4.854*** 4.849*** 4.820*** 4.752*** 4.741*** 4.825***  -0.186 -0.188 -0.292 -0.233 -0.231 -0.295 
 (8.61) (8.61) (8.55) (8.43) (8.41) (8.55)  (-0.81) (-0.81) (-1.10) (-0.96) (-0.95) (-1.11) 
VOLATILITY -4.551*** -4.548*** -4.658*** -4.615*** -4.612*** -4.659***  -3.231* -3.271* -3.217* -3.242* -3.280* -3.218* 
 (-4.37) (-4.37) (-4.50) (-4.41) (-4.40) (-4.51)  0.160*** 0.159*** 0.224*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.221*** 
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES YES YES  NO NO NO NO NO NO 
OBSERVATIONS 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105  13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 13,105 
(PSEUDO )R2 0.334 0.334 0.332 0.333 0.333 0.332  0.336 0.335 0.329 0.335 0.334 0.329 
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Table 4 Effects of institutional ownerships on dividend policy 
The table shows the results of the regression models that use institutional ownership to explain the dividend policy in the next period. The firm-fixed effect 
regression model (results in columns 1-6) is specified as: 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1,𝑖+𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡, and the regression model of 
changes in variables (results in columns 7-12) is specified as: ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1+𝛼2∆𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1(∆𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (industry, year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡. In Panel A, 
the dependent variable is the cash dividend per share DIV, and in Panel B, the dependent variable is the dummy DIVDM, which is coded one if the firm pays cash 
dividends in a year and zero otherwise. The variable definitions are the same as those in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 
10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Inclusion of industry dummies and year dummies are indicated by “YES” or “NO”.  
 
Panel A Effects of institutional ownerships on DIV 
 
                                                                                                    Fixed effects                                                                                                  Changes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV  DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV 
MF 0.130*** 0.130***      0.072*** 0.072***     
 (6.22) (6.22)      (3.08) (3.08)     
BIS -0.011  0.004     0.003  0.011    
 (-0.15)  (0.05)     (0.04)  (0.13)    
MFMV    0.115*** 0.115***      0.043** 0.044**  
    (6.38) (6.42)      (2.24) (2.29)  
BISMV    0.044  0.073     0.073  0.083 
    (0.54)  (0.90)     (0.82)  (0.94) 
FCF 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.083***  0.025** 0.025** 0.026** 0.025** 0.025** 0.026** 
 (5.32) (5.33) (5.66) (5.33) (5.33) (5.65)  (2.00) (2.00) (2.09) (2.03) (2.03) (2.08) 
GROWTH 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.27) (2.27) (2.11) (2.16) (2.16) (2.10)  (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
HERF10 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.057***  0.026 0.026 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.021 
 (3.58) (3.58) (3.08) (3.36) (3.39) (3.04)  (0.98) (0.98) (0.83) (0.83) (0.87) (0.78) 
SOE -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006  -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.26) (-1.23) (-1.23) (-1.26)  (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.30) (-1.28) 
EPS 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.070***  -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 
 (11.70) (11.71) (13.05) (11.69) (11.70) (13.03)  (-1.34) (-1.34) (-0.98) (-1.27) (-1.27) (-0.99) 
LNASSET -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009***  -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-4.38) (-4.38) (-3.39) (-3.99) (-4.01) (-3.36)  (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.62) (-0.68) (-0.71) (-0.59) 
MAO -0.064 -0.064 -0.069 -0.065 -0.065 -0.069  -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 -0.080 
 (-1.01) (-1.01) (-1.09) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.09)  (-1.36) (-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.35) (-1.36) (-1.34) 
LEVE -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (-1.26) (-1.26) (-1.33) (-1.09) (-1.10) (-1.32)  (0.77) (0.77) (0.77) (0.83) (0.82) (0.78) 
ROA -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.145*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.145***  0.024 0.024 0.019 0.024 0.024 0.019 
 (-5.06) (-5.07) (-5.64) (-5.09) (-5.09) (-5.64)  (1.06) (1.06) (0.85) (1.03) (1.04) (0.84) 
VOLATILITY -0.025 -0.025 -0.028 -0.022 -0.022 -0.027  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.004 
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 (-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.79) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.78)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.16) (0.23) (0.22) (0.16) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO NO NO NO NO  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 11,059 11,059 11,059 11,059 11,059 11,059  9,300 9,300 9,300 9,300 9,300 9,300 
R2 0.043 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.043 0.041  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 
Panel B Effects of institutional ownerships on DIVDM 
 
Fixed effects                                Changes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM  DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM 
MF 0.316*** 0.318***      0.229*** 0.232***     
 (4.42) (4.45)      (2.60) (2.63)     
BIS 0.230  0.267     0.382  0.407    
 (0.88)  (1.02)     (1.18)  (1.25)    
MFMV    0.275*** 0.280***      0.177** 0.182**  
    (4.47) (4.56)      (2.44) (2.51)  
BISMV    0.388  0.458*     0.425  0.467 
    (1.40)  (1.66)     (1.27)  (1.40) 
FCF 0.098** 0.098** 0.110** 0.098** 0.099** 0.110**  0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.004 
 (1.97) (1.97) (2.21) (1.97) (1.98) (2.20)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) 
GROWTH 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.74) (0.75) (0.63) (0.66) (0.67) (0.63)  (-0.92) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.94) (-0.95) (-0.93) 
HERF10 0.458*** 0.460*** 0.435*** 0.447*** 0.451*** 0.432***  0.288*** 0.294*** 0.275*** 0.279*** 0.286*** 0.274*** 
 (7.10) (7.14) (6.76) (6.93) (7.01) (6.71)  (2.82) (2.88) (2.70) (2.73) (2.80) (2.68) 
SOE -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013  -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 
 (-0.73) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.74) (-0.75) (-0.76)  (-1.27) (-1.28) (-1.26) (-1.27) (-1.28) (-1.27) 
EPS 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.176*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.175***  -0.016 -0.016 -0.010 -0.016 -0.016 -0.010 
 (8.61) (8.61) (9.58) (8.60) (8.61) (9.55)  (-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.48) (-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.50) 
LNASSET -0.016* -0.016* -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.009  -0.018 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 
 (-1.69) (-1.68) (-0.96) (-1.35) (-1.40) (-0.91)  (-1.09) (-1.11) (-0.90) (-0.96) (-1.01) (-0.87) 
MAO 0.290 0.291 0.278 0.289 0.289 0.279  0.355 0.354 0.356 0.357 0.354 0.359 
 (1.35) (1.35) (1.29) (1.34) (1.34) (1.29)  (1.57) (1.57) (1.58) (1.58) (1.57) (1.59) 
LEVE -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.081***  -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 
 (-3.04) (-3.04) (-3.10) (-2.91) (-2.92) (-3.07)  (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.41) 
ROA -0.213** -0.213** -0.249*** -0.215** -0.214** -0.248***  0.036 0.038 0.020 0.039 0.040 0.021 
 (-2.43) (-2.42) (-2.84) (-2.45) (-2.44) (-2.83)  (0.42) (0.44) (0.24) (0.45) (0.46) (0.24) 
VOLATILITY -0.134 -0.135 -0.142 -0.126 -0.128 -0.140  0.042 0.043 0.039 0.047 0.047 0.040 
 (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.19) (-1.06) (-1.08) (-1.17)  (0.41) (0.42) (0.38) (0.46) (0.45) (0.39) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO NO NO NO NO  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 11,059 11,059 11,059 11,059 11,059 11,059  9,300 9,300 9,300 9,300 9,300 9,300 
R2 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.036 0.034  0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 
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Table 5 Effects of institutional ownerships on dividend policy, SOEs versus non-SOEs 
The table shows the results of the regression models that use institutional ownership to explain the dividend policy in the next period for the SOEs and non-SOEs 
separately. The firm-fixed effect regression model (results shown in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6) is specified as: 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1,𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 
(𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡, and the regression model of changes in variables (results shown in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8) is specified as, 
∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1+𝛼2∆𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1(∆𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (industry, year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the cash dividend per share DIV, and 
in Panel B, the dependent variable is the dummy DIVDM, which is coded one if the firm pays cash dividends in a year and zero otherwise. The variable definitions 
are the same as those in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Inclusion of 
industry dummies and year dummies are indicated by “YES” or “NO”.  
 
Panel A Effects of institutional ownerships on DIV, SOEs versus non-SOEs   
 
                                                                                                           SOEs                                                                                                                        Non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fix  Fix Changes Changes  Fix  Fix Changes Changes 
 DIV DIV DIV DIV  DIV DIV DIV DIV 
MF 0.151***  0.110***   0.034  -0.018  
 (5.12)  (3.47)   (1.12)  (-0.51)  
BIS -0.049  -0.117   0.190  0.454***  
 (-0.52)  (-1.09)   (1.31)  (2.92)  
MFMV  0.132***  0.066**   0.030  -0.016 
  (5.22)  (2.52)   (1.18)  (-0.56) 
BISMV  0.018  -0.051   0.169  0.440*** 
  (0.17)  (-0.45)   (1.21)  (3.00) 
FCF 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.023 0.024  0.052*** 0.052*** 0.018 0.017 
 (4.00) (4.02) (1.24) (1.30)  (2.79) (2.78) (1.04) (1.00) 
GROWTH 0.006** 0.006** 0.002 0.002  0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.19) (2.11) (0.78) (0.76)  (0.27) (0.27) (-0.61) (-0.60) 
HERF 0.024 0.018 -0.022 -0.029  0.117*** 0.115*** 0.097** 0.095** 
 (0.86) (0.63) (-0.58) (-0.76)  (4.06) (4.00) (2.20) (2.16) 
EPS 0.069*** 0.069*** -0.011 -0.011  0.055*** 0.055*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (8.40) (8.45) (-1.44) (-1.33)  (7.15) (7.10) (-0.02) (-0.02) 
LNASSET -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.015** -0.014**  -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 
 (-4.71) (-4.38) (-2.16) (-1.99)  (-0.06) (0.04) (0.60) (0.65) 
MAO 0.172 0.170 -0.070 -0.084  -0.086 -0.085 -0.091* -0.089* 
 (0.49) (0.48) (-0.21) (-0.25)  (-1.63) (-1.63) (-1.69) (-1.65) 
LEVE 0.005 0.006 0.018 0.018  -0.000 0.000 0.022* 0.023* 
 (0.35) (0.40) (1.04) (1.06)  (-0.05) (0.01) (1.74) (1.78) 
ROA -0.113** -0.117** 0.044 0.042  -0.120*** -0.119*** 0.016 0.017 
 (-2.48) (-2.57) (1.08) (1.03)  (-3.86) (-3.83) (0.55) (0.56) 
VOLATILITY -0.022 -0.018 0.015 0.017  -0.042 -0.040 -0.025 -0.024 
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 (-0.37) (-0.30) (0.30) (0.33)  (-1.00) (-0.96) (-0.66) (-0.63) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 6,687 6,687 5,620 5,620  4,070 4,070 3,188 3,188 
R2 0.048 0.048 0.009 0.008  0.040 0.040 0.012 0.012 
 
Panel B Effects of institutional ownerships on DIVDM, SOE versus non-SOEs   
 
 SOEs                                                                                                                     Non-SOEs   
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fix  Fix Changes Changes  Fix  Fix Changes Changes 
 DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM  DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM DIVDM 
MF 0.321***  0.257**   0.207*  0.136  
 (3.45)  (2.27)   (1.65)  (0.89)  
BIS -0.132  0.081   1.522**  1.380**  
 (-0.44)  (0.21)   (2.52)  (2.07)  
MFMV  0.254***  0.181*   0.211**  0.135 
  (3.18)  (1.93)   (1.97)  (1.07) 
BISMV  0.059  0.245   1.167**  0.862 
  (0.18)  (0.60)   (2.01)  (1.36) 
FCF 0.028 0.030 -0.094 -0.092  0.177** 0.175** 0.095 0.091 
 (0.40) (0.42) (-1.43) (-1.40)  (2.28) (2.25) (1.28) (1.23) 
GROWTH 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004  -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.51) (0.46) (0.50) (0.48)  (-0.42) (-0.43) (-1.48) (-1.47) 
HERF10 0.410*** 0.394*** 0.268** 0.251*  0.543*** 0.530*** 0.413** 0.402** 
 (4.61) (4.43) (1.97) (1.85)  (4.55) (4.45) (2.18) (2.12) 
EPS 0.158*** 0.160*** -0.017 -0.016  0.150*** 0.147*** -0.010 -0.013 
 (6.13) (6.22) (-0.60) (-0.57)  (4.66) (4.55) (-0.30) (-0.37) 
LNASSET -0.026* -0.022* -0.088*** -0.085***  0.014 0.016 0.034 0.035 
 (-1.91) (-1.65) (-3.62) (-3.50)  (0.79) (0.93) (1.21) (1.24) 
MAO 0.007 -0.002 -0.061 -0.095  0.247 0.249 0.341 0.346 
 (0.01) (-0.00) (-0.05) (-0.08)  (1.14) (1.15) (1.47) (1.49) 
LEVE -0.124*** -0.123*** 0.060 0.062  -0.010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.010 
 (-2.71) (-2.69) (0.97) (1.00)  (-0.27) (-0.18) (-0.23) (-0.18) 
ROA -0.165 -0.177 0.090 0.089  -0.193 -0.184 0.014 0.023 
 (-1.15) (-1.23) (0.61) (0.60)  (-1.50) (-1.42) (0.11) (0.18) 
VOLATILITY 0.078 0.085 0.141 0.147  -0.273 -0.260 -0.131 -0.125 
 (0.42) (0.46) (0.78) (0.81)  (-1.58) (-1.50) (-0.82) (-0.78) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 6,687 6,687 5,620 5,620  4,070 4,070 3,188 3,188 
R2 0.034 0.033 0.010 0.010  0.036 0.035 0.012 0.011 
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Table 6 Effects of institutional ownerships and free cash flows on dividend policy 
The table shows the results of the regression models that use institutional ownership and relative free cash flows to explain the dividend payments in the next 
period. The firm-fixed effect regression model (results in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6) is specified as: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1+𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡, and the regression model of changes in variables (results in columns 3, 4 
7 and 8) is specified as, ∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1+𝛼2∆𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3∆𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ ∆𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝛼4∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (industry, year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where FCFDM is a dummy 
variable that is coded one if the residual of regression free cash flows against Tobin’s Q for all firms in each industry and each year is positive, and otherwise zero. 
The dependent variables are the cash dividend per share DIV (columns 1-4) and dividend dummy DIVDM (columns 5-8). The variable definitions are the same as 
those in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Inclusion of industry 
dummies and year dummies are indicated by “YES” or “NO”.  
    
                                                             Fixed effects                                                 Changes                                                 Fixed effects                                                    Changes 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 DIV DIV   DIV  DIV   DIVDM  DIVDM   DIVDM  DIVDM  
MF -0.017   -0.003   -0.029   0.008  
 (-0.89)   (-0.14)   (-0.45)   (0.10)  
MF*FCFDM 0.175***   0.067***   0.257***   0.122  
 (7.97)   (3.17)   (3.42)   (1.53)  
MFMV  -0.008   -0.027   0.024   0.047 
  (-0.47)   (-1.53)   (0.40)   (0.70) 
MFMV*FCFDM  0.137***   0.032*   0.185***   0.071 
  (7.19)   (1.78)   (2.84)   (1.04) 
FCF 0.054*** 0.059***  0.016 0.021  0.067 0.078  -0.014 -0.006 
 (3.56) (3.96)  (1.26) (1.63)  (1.31) (1.52)  (-0.28) (-0.12) 
GROWTH 0.004** 0.004**  0.000 0.000  0.004 0.004  -0.005 -0.005 
 (2.15) (2.12)  (0.14) (0.13)  (0.65) (0.66)  (-0.95) (-0.93) 
HERF10 0.065*** 0.062***  0.025 0.022  0.447*** 0.445***  0.285*** 0.283*** 
 (3.45) (3.29)  (0.91) (0.81)  (6.93) (6.91)  (2.80) (2.78) 
SOE -0.006 -0.006  -0.008 -0.008  -0.013 -0.013  -0.031 -0.031 
 (-1.24) (-1.23)  (-1.31) (-1.30)  (-0.77) (-0.76)  (-1.28) (-1.28) 
EPS 0.065*** 0.065***  -0.006 -0.006  0.168*** 0.168***  -0.012 -0.012 
 (11.94) (12.04)  (-1.22) (-1.10)  (9.05) (9.06)  (-0.61) (-0.58) 
LNASSET -0.010*** -0.010***  -0.003 -0.002  -0.011 -0.011  -0.016 -0.016 
 (-3.75) (-3.60)  (-0.69) (-0.51)  (-1.11) (-1.16)  (-0.97) (-0.98) 
MAO -0.064 -0.067  -0.080 -0.083  0.286 0.283  0.357 0.358 
 (-1.02) (-1.05)  (-1.34) (-1.38)  (1.33) (1.31)  (1.58) (1.59) 
LEVE -0.010 -0.009  0.008 0.008  -0.081*** -0.080***  -0.016 -0.015 
 (-1.28) (-1.18)  (0.77) (0.79)  (-3.07) (-3.01)  (-0.42) (-0.41) 
ROA -0.132*** -0.134***  0.023 0.022  -0.230*** -0.231***  0.029 0.027 
 (-5.13) (-5.22)  (1.02) (0.95)  (-2.61) (-2.63)  (0.34) (0.31) 
VOLATILITY -0.023 -0.022  0.006 0.005  -0.135 -0.133  0.042 0.043 
 (-0.66) (-0.62)  (0.20) (0.19)  (-1.14) (-1.11)  (0.40) (0.42) 
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INDUSTRY  NO NO  YES YES  NO NO  YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 11,059 11,059  9,300 9,300  11,059 11,059  9,300 9,300 
R2 0.043 0.042  0.005 0.005  0.035 0.035  0.007 0.007 
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Table 7 Effects of institutional ownerships on agency costs 
The table shows the results of regression models that use institutional ownership to explain the agency costs in the next period. The firm-fixed effect regression 
model (results in columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10) is specified as: 𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1,𝑖+𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡, and the regression model of 
changes in variables (results in columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12) is specified as: ∆𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1+𝛼2∆𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1(∆𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (industry, year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
The dependent variable AC is a firm’s agency costs (operating expense scaled by annual sales) minus its industry median. The regressions are run separately for 
SOEs and non-SOEs. FORO refers to foreign ownerships, and LPO is the legal person ownership. TANG is the net fixed assets plus inventory over total assets. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of annual sales, and ADJR refers to the market-adjusted annual stock returns. Control variables also include DUA, a dummy variable 
equals one if CEO and chairman are separated individuals and zero otherwise, INDEP, number of independent directors and DIRECTOR, the board size. The other 
variable definitions are the same as those in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Inclusion of industry dummies and year dummies are indicated by “YES” or “NO”.  
 
                                                                FULL                                                            SOEs                                                   Non-SOEs 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Fix  Fix changes changes  Fix  Fix changes changes  Fix  Fix changes changes 
 AC AC AC AC  AC AC AC AC  AC AC AC AC 
MF -0.071***  -0.020   -0.094***  -0.036*   -0.053  -0.014  
 (-4.05)  (-1.09)   (-4.94)  (-1.86)   (-1.54)  (-0.39)  
BIS -0.109*  -0.045   -0.163***  -0.029   -0.053  -0.196  
 (-1.69)  (-0.67)   (-2.63)  (-0.44)   (-0.32)  (-1.23)  
MFMV  -0.072***  -0.024   -0.084***  -0.036**   -0.057*  -0.020 
  (-4.74)  (-1.59)   (-5.06)  (-2.23)   (-1.90)  (-0.64) 
BISMV  -0.140**  -0.076   -0.202***  -0.049   -0.025  -0.234 
  (-2.07)  (-1.12)   (-3.02)  (-0.72)   (-0.15)  (-1.54) 
DIV -0.043*** -0.041*** 0.003 0.004  -0.031*** -0.029*** 0.005 0.006  -0.058*** -0.056*** 0.002 0.001 
 (-4.73) (-4.51) (0.42) (0.46)  (-3.44) (-3.24) (0.66) (0.72)  (-2.66) (-2.59) (0.08) (0.07) 
LPO -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.032* -0.031*  -0.020 -0.016 -0.025 -0.024  -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.071** -0.070** 
 (-3.14) (-3.04) (-1.82) (-1.77)  (-0.92) (-0.74) (-0.97) (-0.92)  (-3.73) (-3.70) (-2.54) (-2.51) 
FORO -0.016 -0.015 0.022 0.023  0.002 0.001 0.073* 0.074*  0.004 0.006 0.025 0.027 
 (-0.62) (-0.57) (0.74) (0.77)  (0.05) (0.03) (1.70) (1.72)  (0.11) (0.15) (0.53) (0.57) 
MAO -0.060 -0.060 0.000 -0.001  -0.173 -0.173 -0.198 -0.193  -0.048 -0.048 -0.014 -0.015 
 (-1.09) (-1.09) (0.00) (-0.01)  (-0.73) (-0.73) (-1.00) (-0.97)  (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.23) (-0.26) 
HERF10 -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.028 -0.027  -0.022 -0.021 0.033 0.034  -0.205*** -0.204*** -0.090** -0.090** 
 (-8.20) (-8.19) (-1.36) (-1.34)  (-1.10) (-1.07) (1.43) (1.47)  (-6.35) (-6.33) (-2.08) (-2.08) 
TANG 0.019** 0.018** 0.010 0.010  0.012 0.011 0.007 0.007  0.016 0.015 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.28) (2.24) (1.19) (1.19)  (1.24) (1.20) (0.67) (0.66)  (1.03) (1.02) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
LEVE 0.029*** 0.028*** -0.018** -0.018**  0.035*** 0.033*** -0.016* -0.017*  0.005 0.005 -0.039*** -0.040*** 
 (4.64) (4.44) (-2.48) (-2.53)  (3.93) (3.73) (-1.69) (-1.75)  (0.46) (0.42) (-3.10) (-3.13) 
SIZE 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.013***  0.019*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.012***  0.020*** 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (14.55) (14.52) (8.28) (8.27)  (8.55) (8.34) (4.61) (4.57)  (7.49) (7.49) (3.67) (3.68) 
ADJR -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.001  -0.004** -0.003** 0.001 0.001  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.005** -0.004** 
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 (-4.71) (-4.31) (-1.57) (-1.37)  (-2.28) (-1.97) (1.03) (1.18)  (-3.56) (-3.41) (-2.43) (-2.28) 
DUA 0.008** 0.008** 0.001 0.001  -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000  0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 
 (2.24) (2.21) (0.39) (0.37)  (-0.51) (-0.58) (-0.06) (-0.07)  (0.83) (0.82) (0.73) (0.72) 
INDEP -0.043* -0.044* -0.047** -0.047**  -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002  -0.120*** -0.121*** -0.119*** -0.119*** 
 (-1.89) (-1.92) (-2.14) (-2.14)  (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.07) (-0.08)  (-2.69) (-2.71) (-2.77) (-2.76) 
DIRECTOR -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001  -0.004** -0.004** -0.003* -0.003* 
 (-1.07) (-1.07) (0.02) (0.01)  (-0.30) (-0.26) (0.69) (0.69)  (-2.50) (-2.51) (-1.66) (-1.66) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 10,680 10,680 8,989 8,989  6,480 6,480 5,427 5,427  3,901 3,901 3,077 3,077 
R2 0.067 0.068 0.038 0.038  0.061 0.062 0.025 0.026  0.076 0.076 0.055 0.055 
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Table 8 Effects of institutional ownerships on firm performance 
The table shows the results of regression models that use institutional ownership to explain the return on assets in the next period. The firm-fixed effect regression 
model (results in columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10) is specified as: 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1,𝑖+𝛼2𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (year) +𝜀𝑖,𝑡, and the regression model 
of changes in variables (results in columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12) is specified as: ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=𝛼1+𝛼2∆𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1(∆𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝛼3∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1+Dummy (industry, year) 
+𝜀𝑖,𝑡. The dependent variable ROA is a firm’s return on assets (net profits over total assets) minus its industry median. FORO refers to foreign ownerships, and 
LPO is the legal person ownership. TANG is the net fixed assets plus inventory over total assets.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of annual sales, and ADJR 
refers to the market-adjusted annual stock returns. Control variables also include DUA, a dummy variable equals one if CEO and chairman are separated 
individuals and zero otherwise, INDEP, number of independent directors and DIRECTOR, the board size. The other variable definitions are the same as those in 
Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Inclusion of industry dummies and 
year dummies are indicated by “YES” or “NO”.  
 
FULL                                                                                       SOEs                                                                                  Non-SOEs 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Fix  Fix changes changes  Fix  Fix changes changes  Fix  Fix changes changes 
 ROA  ROA   ROA   ROA    ROA   ROA   ROA   ROA    ROA   ROA   ROA   ROA  
MF 0.051***  0.031*   0.062***  0.030*   0.038  0.051  
 (3.69)  (1.88)   (4.33)  (1.68)   (1.38)  (1.58)  
BIS 0.035  -0.006   0.058  0.034   0.010  -0.035  
 (0.68)  (-0.09)   (1.24)  (0.57)   (0.07)  (-0.25)  
MFMV  0.063***  0.036***   0.072***  0.035**   0.039  0.043 
  (5.26)  (2.60)   (5.78)  (2.37)   (1.62)  (1.62) 
BISMV  0.090*  0.018   0.112**  0.066   0.045  -0.039 
  (1.67)  (0.29)   (2.23)  (1.06)   (0.34)  (-0.29) 
DIV 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.008 0.008  0.050*** 0.047*** 0.013* 0.013*  0.061*** 0.061*** 0.002 0.001 
 (7.55) (7.25) (1.10) (1.03)  (7.27) (6.94) (1.86) (1.79)  (3.52) (3.48) (0.09) (0.06) 
LPO -0.001 -0.002 -0.021 -0.022  0.003 -0.000 0.006 0.005  -0.006 -0.006 -0.037 -0.037 
 (-0.07) (-0.19) (-1.32) (-1.37)  (0.15) (-0.01) (0.27) (0.21)  (-0.32) (-0.33) (-1.49) (-1.51) 
FORO 0.023 0.022 -0.007 -0.008  0.020 0.021 -0.034 -0.035  -0.013 -0.014 -0.000 -0.002 
 (1.14) (1.08) (-0.23) (-0.27)  (0.72) (0.75) (-0.86) (-0.89)  (-0.40) (-0.44) (-0.00) (-0.05) 
MAO 0.053 0.053 -0.016 -0.015  0.029 0.032 -0.008 -0.012  0.080 0.080 0.004 0.004 
 (1.21) (1.22) (-0.35) (-0.34)  (0.16) (0.18) (-0.04) (-0.07)  (1.55) (1.55) (0.07) (0.08) 
HERF10 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.070*** 0.070***  0.053*** 0.053*** 0.012 0.011  0.169*** 0.169*** 0.087** 0.086** 
 (10.14) (10.15) (3.76) (3.74)  (3.51) (3.53) (0.57) (0.52)  (6.50) (6.49) (2.27) (2.25) 
TANG 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009  0.003 0.003 0.016* 0.016*  0.001 0.001 0.016 0.016 
 (1.33) (1.42) (1.14) (1.14)  (0.37) (0.48) (1.74) (1.75)  (0.11) (0.11) (1.08) (1.08) 
LEVE 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.187*** 0.187***  0.027*** 0.029*** 0.182*** 0.182***  0.090*** 0.091*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 
 (8.12) (8.33) (28.56) (28.61)  (4.09) (4.34) (20.47) (20.54)  (10.24) (10.28) (19.05) (19.07) 
SIZE -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012***  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.022*** -0.022***  -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (-9.11) (-9.18) (-7.77) (-7.76)  (-5.51) (-5.51) (-9.29) (-9.28)  (-3.20) (-3.18) (-2.10) (-2.09) 
ADJR 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.000 -0.000  0.005*** 0.004*** -0.000 -0.001  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.001 
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 (6.58) (6.00) (0.24) (-0.00)  (4.12) (3.53) (-0.46) (-0.72)  (4.02) (3.88) (0.49) (0.46) 
DUA 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000  0.010* 0.010* 0.001 0.001 
 (1.32) (1.36) (0.21) (0.23)  (0.63) (0.69) (-0.14) (-0.12)  (1.92) (1.93) (0.23) (0.24) 
INDEP 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.072***  0.051*** 0.052*** 0.067*** 0.067***  0.016 0.016 0.056 0.056 
 (3.35) (3.40) (3.52) (3.54)  (2.65) (2.71) (2.94) (2.95)  (0.45) (0.46) (1.47) (1.48) 
DIRECTOR -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001  0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001  -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.55) (-0.53) (0.89) (0.90)  (0.00) (-0.01) (1.09) (1.09)  (-0.19) (-0.18) (0.96) (0.97) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
OASERVATIONS 10,680 10,680 8,989 8,989  6,480 6,480 5,427 5,427  3,901 3,901 3,077 3,077 
R2 0.047 0.049 0.110 0.110  0.040 0.043 0.094 0.095  0.077 0.078 0.140 0.140 
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Table 9 Reverse regressions 
The table shows the results of the reverse regression models that use the changes in dividend policy and agency costs from time t-2 to t-1 to explain the changes in 
institutional ownership from time t-1 to t. The regression model is specified as, ∆𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =𝛼1 +𝛼2∆𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝛼3∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. The variable definitions are the same as those in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 
5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Inclusion of industry dummies and year dummies are indicated by “YES” or “NO”.  
 
FULL SAMPLE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ∆MF ∆MFMV ∆BIS ∆BISMV ∆MF ∆MFMV ∆BIS ∆BISMV 
∆AC -0.815 -0.421 0.024 -0.004 -0.770 -0.312 0.017 -0.011 
 (-1.22) (-0.53) (0.14) (-0.02) (-1.15) (-0.40) (0.10) (-0.07) 
∆DIV -0.285 -0.682 0.234* 0.252**     
 (-0.59) (-1.19) (1.85) (2.07)     
∆DIVDM     0.080 0.190 0.060* 0.067** 
     (0.62) (1.25) (1.79) (2.07) 
∆LPO -2.486** -2.376* 0.189 0.009 -2.480** -2.363* 0.195 0.016 
 (-2.34) (-1.89) (0.68) (0.03) (-2.33) (-1.88) (0.70) (0.06) 
∆FORO -1.270 -3.570 -0.260 -0.391 -1.269 -3.567 -0.248 -0.378 
 (-0.69) (-1.63) (-0.53) (-0.84) (-0.68) (-1.63) (-0.51) (-0.81) 
∆MAO 2.899 5.894* -0.674 -0.442 2.899 5.893* -0.662 -0.429 
 (0.98) (1.69) (-0.87) (-0.59) (0.98) (1.68) (-0.85) (-0.57) 
∆HERF10 1.064 1.087 0.015 0.091 1.045 1.043 0.026 0.102 
 (0.88) (0.76) (0.05) (0.30) (0.86) (0.73) (0.08) (0.33) 
∆TANG -0.301 -0.095 -0.013 -0.040 -0.301 -0.093 -0.014 -0.041 
 (-0.57) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.30) (-0.57) (-0.15) (-0.10) (-0.31) 
∆LEVE 0.267 -0.074 0.022 0.045 0.282 -0.037 0.023 0.046 
 (0.61) (-0.14) (0.19) (0.41) (0.65) (-0.07) (0.20) (0.42) 
∆SIZE 0.116 0.091 0.043* 0.050** 0.111 0.081 0.043* 0.050** 
 (1.16) (0.78) (1.65) (2.00) (1.12) (0.69) (1.65) (2.00) 
∆ADJR -0.167*** 0.008 -0.004 -0.019 -0.169*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.018 
 (-2.79) (0.11) (-0.25) (-1.25) (-2.83) (0.03) (-0.21) (-1.22) 
∆DUA -0.174 0.006 -0.040 -0.036 -0.174 0.006 -0.040 -0.035 
 (-1.05) (0.03) (-0.93) (-0.85) (-1.05) (0.03) (-0.92) (-0.83) 
∆INDEP -1.226 -1.102 0.220 -0.045 -1.233 -1.119 0.209 -0.057 
 (-0.92) (-0.70) (0.63) (-0.13) (-0.92) (-0.71) (0.59) (-0.17) 
∆DIRECTOR -0.029 -0.053 0.002 -0.006 -0.030 -0.056 0.002 -0.007 
 (-0.51) (-0.79) (0.12) (-0.45) (-0.53) (-0.84) (0.10) (-0.47) 
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 8,989 8,989 8,989 8,989 8,989 8,989 8,989 8,989 
R2 0.031 0.080 0.007 0.015 0.031 0.080 0.007 0.015 
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Table 10 Instrumental variable method 
This table shows the results of the two-stage instrumental variable regressions. All independent variables in both stages are lagged by one period. PROA is the 
proportion of tradable A-shares. INDEX is a dummy which equals one if the firm is included in the Shanghai 180 Index or Shenzhen Component Index in a year, 
and zero otherwise. The other variable definitions are the same as those in Table 1. The second stage uses firm-fixed effect regressions. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Inclusion of industry dummies and year dummies are indicated by “YES” 
or “NO”.  
 
Second stage       First stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
 DIV DIV DIVDM DIVDM   MF MFMV 
MF 0.675***  1.590***   PROA 0.040*** 0.021*** 
 (4.96)  (3.36)    (12.02) (5.53) 
MFMV  0.840***  2.167***  INDEX 0.011*** 0.017*** 
  (4.74)  (3.52)   (5.06) (6.51) 
FCF -0.013 -0.046* -0.149** -0.245***  FCF 0.083*** 0.105*** 
 (-0.72) (-1.93) (-2.31) (-2.97)   (9.51) (10.63) 
GROWTH 0.002 0.003* 0.012* 0.015**  GROWTH -0.001 -0.002 
 (1.30) (1.79) (1.94) (2.33)   (-0.82) (-1.56) 
HERF10 0.087*** 0.067*** 0.345*** 0.308***  HERF10 -0.054*** -0.035*** 
 (3.87) (3.28) (4.41) (4.37)   (-8.37) (-4.78) 
SOE -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 0.000  SOE -0.003* -0.005*** 
 (-0.76) (-0.45) (-0.26) (0.00)   (-1.76) (-2.67) 
EPS -0.025** -0.038** -0.056 -0.101*  EPS 0.079*** 0.078*** 
 (-2.10) (-2.55) (-1.33) (-1.94)   (28.05) (24.78) 
LNASSET -0.004 -0.000 0.008 0.016  LNASSET 0.011*** 0.006*** 
 (-1.19) (-0.00) (0.76) (1.64)   (14.92) (6.49) 
MAO -0.118** -0.190*** 0.052 -0.143  MAO 0.076*** 0.144*** 
 (-2.04) (-3.07) (0.26) (-0.66)   (5.52) (9.28) 
LEVE -0.011 0.002 -0.015 0.019  LEVE -0.005* -0.018*** 
 (-1.45) (0.24) (-0.57) (0.67)   (-1.67) (-5.62) 
ROA 0.021 0.021 0.071 0.089  ROA -0.129*** -0.102*** 
 (0.68) (0.65) (0.65) (0.81)   (-8.71) (-6.11) 
VOLATILITY 0.005 -0.023 0.053 -0.021  VOLATILITY 0.010 0.040 
 (0.15) (-0.68) (0.45) (-0.18)   (0.66) (1.64) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO NO NO  INDUSTRY  YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES  YEAR  YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 11,059 11,059 11,059 11,059  OASERVATIONS 11,059 11,059 
R2 0.277 0.210 0.257 0.217  R2 0.251 0.222 
      F-TEST OF INSTRUMENTS 81.78 34.56 
      (P-VALUE) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 11 Institutional investment horizon 
This table presents the results of firm-fixed effects regressions by adding an interaction term of weighted average churn rate (WACR) and mutual fund ownership 
as an explanatory variable. The regressions are run separately for the full sample, SOE sample and non-SOE sample. All independent variables are lagged by one 
year. The variables definitions are the same as those in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. Inclusion of industry dummies and year dummies are indicated by “YES” or “NO”.  
 
                                                                               FULL                                                                                           SOEs                                                                                 Non-SOEs 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 DIV DIV DIVDM DIVDM  DIV DIV DIVDM DIVDM  DIV DIV DIVDM DIVDM 
MF 0.255***  0.797***   0.323***  0.773***   0.066  0.741***  
 (6.10)  (5.58)   (5.56)  (4.22)   (1.11)  (3.00)  
MF*WACR -0.336***  -1.300***   -0.468***  -1.229***   -0.049  -1.387**  
 (-3.47)  (-3.94)   (-3.56)  (-2.96)   (-0.34)  (-2.32)  
MFMV  0.222***  0.743***   0.276***  0.672***   0.064  0.668*** 
  (5.92)  (5.80)   (5.20)  (4.02)   (1.24)  (3.11) 
MFMV*WACR  -0.299***  -1.311***   -0.413***  -1.184***   -0.057  -1.227** 
  (-3.24)  (-4.16)   (-3.20)  (-2.91)   (-0.44)  (-2.28) 
FCF 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.098** 0.098**  0.090*** 0.090*** 0.031 0.032  0.052*** 0.052*** 0.170** 0.171** 
 (5.32) (5.33) (1.97) (1.97)  (4.06) (4.06) (0.44) (0.45)  (2.76) (2.76) (2.19) (2.20) 
GROWTH 0.004** 0.004** 0.004 0.003  0.006** 0.005** 0.004 0.003  0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 (2.19) (2.04) (0.66) (0.52)  (2.07) (1.98) (0.41) (0.33)  (0.28) (0.27) (-0.41) (-0.44) 
HERF10 0.070*** 0.063*** 0.468*** 0.449***  0.026 0.018 0.416*** 0.395***  0.117*** 0.115*** 0.545*** 0.529*** 
 (3.68) (3.36) (7.25) (6.98)  (0.93) (0.64) (4.69) (4.47)  (4.08) (4.03) (4.56) (4.44) 
EPS 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.160*** 0.159***  0.069*** 0.069*** 0.158*** 0.160***  0.055*** 0.054*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 
 (11.68) (11.64) (8.59) (8.55)  (8.43) (8.48) (6.15) (6.23)  (7.06) (6.99) (4.54) (4.42) 
LNASSET -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.018* -0.014  -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.028** -0.023*  -0.001 -0.000 0.011 0.014 
 (-4.61) (-4.11) (-1.95) (-1.52)  (-4.91) (-4.47) (-2.08) (-1.73)  (-0.14) (-0.05) (0.64) (0.83) 
MAO -0.064 -0.065 0.291 0.289  0.156 0.146 -0.036 -0.071  -0.085 -0.085 0.252 0.253 
 (-1.01) (-1.03) (1.35) (1.34)  (0.44) (0.41) (-0.03) (-0.06)  (-1.62) (-1.62) (1.16) (1.16) 
LEVE -0.010 -0.008 -0.080*** -0.074***  0.005 0.007 -0.124*** -0.120***  -0.000 0.000 -0.010 -0.006 
 (-1.24) (-1.01) (-3.02) (-2.82)  (0.36) (0.45) (-2.71) (-2.64)  (-0.05) (0.00) (-0.25) (-0.16) 
ROA -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.218** -0.218**  -0.118*** -0.122*** -0.178 -0.189  -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.188 -0.178 
 (-5.11) (-5.12) (-2.49) (-2.49)  (-2.58) (-2.67) (-1.24) (-1.32)  (-3.81) (-3.77) (-1.46) (-1.38) 
VOLATILITY -0.024 -0.020 -0.133 -0.121  -0.021 -0.014 0.079 0.094  -0.042 -0.040 -0.275 -0.260 
 (-0.69) (-0.58) (-1.11) (-1.01)  (-0.37) (-0.25) (0.43) (0.51)  (-1.00) (-0.96) (-1.59) (-1.50) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO NO NO  NO NO NO NO  NO NO NO NO 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 11,059 11,059 11,059 11,059  6,687 6,687 6,687 6,687  4,070 4,070 4,070 4,070 
R2 0.041 0.042 0.037 0.037  0.046 0.045 0.035 0.035  0.038 0.038 0.035 0.035 
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Table 12 Large mutual fund ownership (LMF) 
The table shows the results of regression models that use LMF as an independent variable. LMF for a firm is defined as the aggregate ownership of mutual funds 
that each holds at least 1% shares of the firm. The regressions are run separately for the full sample, SOE sample and non-SOE sample using both firm-fixed effect 
models (columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10) and change models (columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12). The variable definitions are the same as those in Table 1. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Inclusion of industry dummies and year dummies are 
indicated by “YES” or “NO”.  
     
FULL                                                                                           SOEs                                                                                      Non-SOEs 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Fix  Fix Changes  Changes  Fix  Fix Changes  Changes  Fix  Fix Changes  Changes 
 DIV DIVDM DIV DIVDM  DIV DIVDM DIV DIVDM  DIV DIVDM DIV DIVDM 
LMF 0.137*** 0.484*** 0.081** 0.339***  0.115** 0.515*** 0.100** 0.465***  0.072 0.335* 0.008 0.099 
 (4.31) (4.46) (2.38) (2.65)  (2.52) (3.57) (2.12) (2.76)  (1.64) (1.84) (0.15) (0.46) 
FCF 0.080*** 0.100** 0.025** 0.001  0.093*** 0.029 0.024 -0.095  0.052*** 0.177** 0.017 0.093 
 (5.46) (2.01) (2.03) (0.03)  (4.16) (0.41) (1.29) (-1.44)  (2.79) (2.28) (0.98) (1.26) 
GROWTH 0.004** 0.004 0.000 -0.005  0.006** 0.004 0.002 0.004  0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.012 
 (2.17) (0.70) (0.17) (-0.93)  (2.13) (0.48) (0.80) (0.49)  (0.28) (-0.43) (-0.59) (-1.49) 
HERF10 0.063*** 0.454*** 0.025 0.292***  0.014 0.398*** -0.029 0.269**  0.117*** 0.535*** 0.094** 0.394** 
 (3.33) (7.05) (0.93) (2.86)  (0.51) (4.49) (-0.76) (1.99)  (4.06) (4.48) (2.12) (2.08) 
EPS 0.067*** 0.164*** -0.006 -0.015  0.074*** 0.162*** -0.010 -0.016  0.055*** 0.150*** -0.001 -0.010 
 (12.34) (8.88) (-1.19) (-0.73)  (9.10) (6.36) (-1.21) (-0.57)  (7.13) (4.67) (-0.14) (-0.28) 
LNASSET -0.010*** -0.013 -0.003 -0.017  -0.018*** -0.022* -0.014** -0.087***  0.000 0.017 0.004 0.036 
 (-3.76) (-1.35) (-0.71) (-1.01)  (-4.16) (-1.65) (-2.00) (-3.58)  (0.01) (1.00) (0.56) (1.26) 
MAO -0.067 0.286 -0.082 0.351  0.145 -0.055 -0.079 -0.092  -0.085 0.248 -0.092* 0.340 
 (-1.06) (1.33) (-1.37) (1.56)  (0.41) (-0.05) (-0.24) (-0.08)  (-1.63) (1.14) (-1.70) (1.47) 
LEVE -0.010 -0.080*** 0.008 -0.015  0.003 -0.127*** 0.018 0.060  -0.000 -0.009 0.023* -0.011 
 (-1.28) (-3.03) (0.78) (-0.41)  (0.23) (-2.79) (1.02) (0.96)  (-0.01) (-0.22) (1.78) (-0.19) 
ROA -0.138*** -0.222** 0.022 0.034  -0.126*** -0.178 0.038 0.087  -0.119*** -0.194 0.019 0.015 
 (-5.35) (-2.53) (0.97) (0.39)  (-2.75) (-1.24) (0.94) (0.59)  (-3.84) (-1.50) (0.66) (0.12) 
VOLATILITY -0.025 -0.133 0.005 0.043  -0.022 0.083 0.014 0.146  -0.042 -0.275 -0.024 -0.129 
 (-0.72) (-1.11) (0.19) (0.42)  (-0.37) (0.45) (0.28) (0.81)  (-1.00) (-1.59) (-0.64) (-0.80) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 11,059 11,059 9,300 9,300  6,687 6,687 5,620 5,620  4,070 4,070 3,188 3,188 
R2 0.038 0.036 0.005 0.007  0.040 0.034 0.008 0.010  0.038 0.033 0.009 0.010 
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Table 13 Another measure of dividend policy: cash dividends over book assets (DIVA) 
The table shows the results of regression models that use DIVA as the dependent variable. The regressions are run separately for the full sample, SOE sample and 
non-SOE sample using both firm-fixed effect models (columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10) and change models (columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12). The variable definitions are 
the same as those in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses are t- statistics. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Inclusion of 
industry dummies and year dummies are indicated by “YES” or “NO”.  
 
                                                                                 FULL                                                                                     SOEs                                                                                       Non-SOEs 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Fix  Fix Changes  Changes  Fix  Fix Changes  Changes  Fix  Fix Changes  Changes 
 DIVA DIVA DIVA DIVA  DIVA DIVA DIVA DIVA  DIVA DIVA DIVA DIVA 
MF 0.017***  0.008***   0.020***  0.011***   0.003  0.000  
 (6.84)  (2.71)   (6.23)  (2.98)   (0.62)  (0.00)  
BIS 0.006  0.010   0.002  -0.003   0.023  0.060***  
 (0.65)  (0.93)   (0.21)  (-0.28)   (1.09)  (2.72)  
MFMV  0.019***  0.006**   0.024***  0.009***   0.001  -0.003 
  (8.78)  (2.41)   (8.75)  (3.18)   (0.28)  (-0.81) 
BISMV  0.016  0.016   0.015  0.004   0.018  0.054*** 
  (1.64)  (1.50)   (1.35)  (0.34)   (0.90)  (2.60) 
FCF 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.002 0.002  0.011*** 0.010*** 0.001 0.002  0.007** 0.007** 0.001 0.001 
 (5.68) (5.59) (1.30) (1.31)  (4.37) (4.27) (0.71) (0.74)  (2.44) (2.45) (0.37) (0.35) 
GROWTH 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000  0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.31) (2.21) (0.67) (0.65)  (2.53) (2.43) (1.35) (1.31)  (-0.01) (-0.03) (-0.10) (-0.11) 
HERF10 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.002 0.001  0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.002  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.007 0.006 
 (4.34) (4.16) (0.53) (0.41)  (0.88) (0.68) (-0.20) (-0.35)  (3.12) (3.06) (1.07) (0.99) 
EPS 0.002** 0.001** -0.001 -0.001  0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.003** 0.003** 0.000 0.001 
 (2.36) (2.00) (-1.12) (-1.12)  (0.88) (0.47) (-1.32) (-1.37)  (2.50) (2.53) (0.38) (0.46) 
LNASSET -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000  -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.002** -0.002**  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (-10.51) (-10.29) (-1.01) (-0.87)  (-9.51) (-9.29) (-2.16) (-2.02)  (-1.23) (-1.12) (0.34) (0.43) 
MAO -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007  0.021 0.022 -0.003 -0.005  -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 
 (-0.68) (-0.67) (-1.02) (-1.01)  (0.53) (0.56) (-0.08) (-0.12)  (-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.14) (-1.10) 
LEVE -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.001 0.001  -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.002 0.002  -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (-5.15) (-4.89) (0.44) (0.51)  (-3.22) (-3.08) (0.82) (0.88)  (-1.03) (-1.00) (1.32) (1.35) 
ROA 0.006** 0.007** 0.002 0.002  0.016*** 0.017*** 0.004 0.004  -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.99) (2.12) (0.68) (0.69)  (3.24) (3.28) (0.82) (0.85)  (-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.16) (-0.21) 
VOLATILITY -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001  -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.001  -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
 (-1.19) (-1.04) (-0.46) (-0.42)  (-0.65) (-0.51) (0.20) (0.25)  (-1.17) (-1.15) (-1.43) (-1.41) 
INDUSTRY  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 11,059 11,059 9,300 9,300  6,687 6,687 5,620 5,620  4,070 4,070 3,188 3,188 
R2 0.047 0.051 0.005 0.005  0.081 0.088 0.007 0.008  0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 
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